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ABSTRACT
By piggybacking on the critiques of the historical discipline provided by Leo
Tolstoy in his momentous novel, War and Peace, I assert that history may undergo a
reconstruction. By ridding the historical discipline of the self-interest that has atrophied
its ability to make a significant, positive impact on the world, and installing a
metaphysics devoted to equality, freedom, and universality, I believe that it may be
revitalized as a profession. I call for a new history, one built in the Hegelian-Marxist
tradition, which will lead humanity into a future defined by love and self-sacrifice. It is a
history explicitly opposed to neutrality; love is not neutral.
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INTRODUCTION
The human as a free agent, unbound by determinism and available for historical
investigation, is foundational to the generally accepted structure of history currently
dominant in the West. The modern historian (in broad terms) asserts that history is
shaped by individual human actions, is knowable to historians through the construction of
historical narratives, and is non-teleological. In his tremendous work, War and Peace,
Leo Tolstoy challenged professional historians and the modern notion of freedom which
undergirds the modern historical enterprise. The critique that he delivered in the novel
covers every inch of the aforementioned ideological ground, from agency, to historical
narration, to non-determinism. Tolstoy viewed history as none of those things; it consists
of natural laws that determine the course of events through time. Natural laws
impersonally dictate the course of events, in which humans happen to be involved.
Humanity, in the meantime, naively believes that its existence possesses that grander
meaning known as freedom. Tolstoy accused historians of essentially being false priests,
proselytizers of a religion that peddles the dishonest narrative of human freedom, when
Tolstoy knows that the only freedom humanity can attain is freedom from the desire for
freedom. And, like so many other such proselytizers, Tolstoy accuses historians of
selling their narrative of freedom for the sake of their own gain.
The self-interest of national identity, which Tolstoy exploited to its fullest when
addressing the historical interpretations of the Napoleonic Wars during his time, is
certainly prominent in his discourse. National identity as a form of political partiality has
featured largely (something modern historians are more likely to admit to now than they
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might have been then) in historical narratives, at least through the Cold War. Modern
historians, and modern academics generally, now understand themselves to be much
more international, inclusive, and globally minded. Conferences and organizations for
the various historical subdisciplines take place on a regular basis, and include PhDs from
universities the world round. Modern historians would therefore be either dismissive of,
or offended by, the critique initially offered by Tolstoy. The self-interest of nationality
is, however, only Tolstoy’s starting point, and is used to illustrate a basic problem which
is the focus of the rest of his polemic: historians write different narratives of past events
because their finite nature as humans prohibit them from understanding the whole, the
universal. And when historians do write different histories, attributing this or that event
to this or that cause in contradictory ways, examples of which Tolstoy illustrated with a
polemic concerning the French invasion of Russia at the beginning of the third volume of
War and Peace, how must such a conflict be mediated? There can be no mediation
between narratives under Tolstoy; the histories written thus far have all been false
reconstructions of the past designed to preserve the self-interested error of freedom.
Tolstoy characterizes the diversion historians attempt to make from determined history,
or truth, as error within a determined system, although that description raises the question
of how error is feasible in a determined system.
The most prominent answer to the question of competing narratives, an answer
which diverges from Tolstoy, rests largely in Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay The Hedgehog
and the Fox. Massively influential on how Tolstoy’s thoughts concerning history have
been understood, Berlin would have had us believe that Tolstoy was resigned to the
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different narratives he disregarded in War and Peace. According to Berlin, Tolstoy was
an historical, empirical Skeptic who believed that history could only be found in the
existence of facts, thus limiting the historical pursuit in its ability to make claims of
certain truth. The type of empiricism described by Berlin avoids the elements of
reconstruction and future action that could be part of the historical discipline, but instead
places absolute primacy on historical data points, thus negating the potential for the
construction and use of facts toward an end. Berlin used the analogy of the hedgehog and
the fox as a dichotomy to understand artists and thinkers relative to their approach to
knowledge and metaphysical truth. He characterized Tolstoy as someone who wished for
a dominant unifying truth, but who knew too much about the world to honestly think such
a metaphysical truth could exist (the fox who believed in being a hedgehog). Such a
characterization was rather convenient for academics of the time, and provided only a
partial look at Tolstoy’s thought. Portraying Tolstoy as favorable to the historian who
would recognize their own limited perspective without seeking something greater was a
theistic narrative.
Berlin’s portrayal of Tolstoy enshrined the particular as valuable and dismissed
hope of the universal. It supported the academic system as bourgeois, since affirming the
particular is also to affirm self-interest. The particular is that which can be identified as
separate. The particular resides within the universal as a single point. The particular may
be described, as it allows for comparison and disparity. Because it can only exist
alongside comparison and disparity, the particular assumes the existence of opposition
and conflict. The universal is that which is; it is comprehensive, all-encompassing,
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without an opposition. The human is particular, its history is particular, and its
expression thus far in its existence has all been particular. Tolstoy recognizes the
universal through natural law, but places humans as subservient to those laws because of
our particularity. We are self-interested, express desire, and take action for those desires
and thus cause violence and conflict because our particularity restricts us from the
universal. Berlin’s approach to the particular-universal dichotomy, or perhaps tension as
described by Tolstoy, lacks nuance, but the empiricism and pluralism he espouses are
part of the particular. Whereas Tolstoy requests us to recognize the universal and submit
ourselves to it, Berlin rejects the universal in favor of a floating realm of particularities.
Regardless of his prominence, Isaiah Berlin is not the only scholar who avoided
the determinist argument in War and Peace, nor is he the only scholar to avoid the
tension between the particular and the universal that Tolstoy portrays. Other historians
and philosophers largely ignored the historical-philosophical stance offered by Tolstoy
for the better part of a century. Even the most prominent Tolstoy scholar during that
time, Boris Eikhenbaum, gave no evaluation to the argument itself, only placed it in the
historical context of Tolstoy’s life. Historians generally have not engaged with the
polemic in War and Peace, the rare exceptions mostly consisting of factual critiques
given by military historians regarding Tolstoy’s account of battles during the French
invasion of Russia. After Berlin’s work, most scholars followed in the path he set out,
including Gary Saul Morson, Hugh McLean, and Lina Steiner. In their works, Tolstoy is
presented as pluralist and a Skeptic. In the last two decades, however, Jeff Love, a
research professor in languages from Clemson University, has pushed an interpretation of
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Tolstoy with more nuance. The Tolstoy characterized by Jeff Love retains the
determinism insisted upon in War and Peace, and Love argues that Tolstoy was not only
generally deterministic regarding the course of history, but deterministic in a pessimism
regarding the results of human attempts to understand the universe. Realizing Tolstoy as
a pessimist, who would rather humanity submit to the laws of nature in peace instead of
attempting to overcome higher laws with action, is of great assistance in understanding
Tolstoy’s view of war, peace, and his polemic against historians. Historians advocate
freedom of action by writing narratives which present individuals as agents, who cause
conflict and violence.
While historians have not responded directly to Tolstoy’s critique, they have
explored the problems of the particular and the universal to some degree. Leopold von
Ranke and his followers advocated for adherence to historical fact via the empirical
analysis of historical documents in order to achieve a full knowledge of the past. While
not philosophically oriented, the empirical approach was widely adopted as a way to
achieve knowledge. R.G. Collingwood, and later thinkers along similar lines, Edward
Hallett Carr and Hayden White, explored the problem of the particular-universal tension
in more philosophical ways. They gave onus for the reconstruction of the past into
narratives on the particular author, as well as the cultural context in which that historian
developed. They characterized the historian as a particular agent creating their own
history, thus particularizing historical writing itself. While each historian featured
nuances of their own, the general theme of an historicization of the historian remained the
same. Other historians have sidestepped the thorniness of philosophical discourse and

5

have attempted to methodologically perform history in such a way as to either overcome
or nullify the tension between the particular and the universal. Steven Bednarksi offers
an excellent example in the microhistory A Poisoned Past: The Life and Times of
Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused Poisoner. Bednarski’s book is an
example of the historian attempting to nullify the particular-universal tension. The
microhistory is written with a heavy emphasis on narrative descriptions and settings, and
takes pains to ensure that the reader is given access to the approach Besnarski uses to
write his historical narrative. He assures the reader that he could have used his sources
differently, analyzed them for different information, and constructed a different narrative
that could not be said to be any less true than his final draft. He wants to put his
viewpoint and particularist perspective as prominently as possible, removing himself
from any potential claim of universal knowledge. On the other hand, Yair Mintzker
presents four different versions of the same historical event in The Many Deaths of Jew
Süss: The Notorious Trial and Execution of an Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, in order to
respect the different possible narratives available in the source documents. He also
includes a new historical mechanic in the monograph: what he refers to as
“conversations.” The conversations are short pieces of dialogue between Mintzker and
what he writes to be the reader of his work. He creates the dialogue for the reader from
the questions, critiques, and comments from reviewers of his book, and writes the
conversations to include as many perspectives as possible. He refers to the type of
history he performs in The Many Deaths of Jew Süss as polyphonic history, which is an
effort to overcome the particularity of writing history by including multiple voices.
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While it is important to recognize that historians have attempted to explore and
confront the question of knowledge in the particular-universal dichotomy, none have
done so through Tolstoy, nor have they solved the central problem. Tolstoy, as
interpreted by Jeff Love, calls us determined because we cannot help but seek universal
knowledge as finite beings, and will suffer as we learn because we are finite. Tolstoy’s
avenue, the route he thinks worthy of pursuit for humanity in order to best live, is to
submit ourselves to the laws of nature. Exploration of those laws is permissible and even
admirable, but attempting to subvert or overcome them can bring nothing but conflict.
Peace is acceptance of our place in the universe, whereas war is to take action in protest
of our place under natural law. In order to attain Tolstoyan peace, self-interest must be
given up. We are unable to think and act in accordance with ultimate law if we persist in
efforts to put the self first; self-interest breeds desire, desire is expression of freedom,
freedom assumes action, and action will bring conflict and violence. Thus Tolstoy’s
positive view of selfless attitudes in War and Peace, above all demonstrated by Platon
Karataev. Karataev is Tolstoy’s example of living life well, and serves as Pierre’s role
model late in the novel. Pierre observes that Karataev has “no attachments, friendships,
or love, as Pierre understood them; but he lived lovingly with everything that life brought
his way, especially other people—not any specific people, but those who were there
before his eyes.”1 Karataev’s character is a denouncement of the particular as well as of
ownership, and a championing for self-sacrifice and love.

1

Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, (New York: Random
House Inc., 2007), 973.
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Tolstoy’s lesson is not to abandon metaphysical truth for the sake of an
epistemological limbo, in which we are suspended in an eternal search for new facts.
Such an empirical principle for a discipline could only serve to encourage the creation of
new knowledge that is forever overwritten by the next generation of facts, resulting in a
never-ending parade of non-attempts at knowledge. Rather, Tolstoy encourages us to
search for knowledge and understanding that emerges through love and self-sacrifice; he
desires history written for the sake of universal enlightenment and peace, divorced from
the self-interest that so often typifies our own work. But Tolstoy is nevertheless
pessimistic. He disbelieves in the possibility of human freedom, which could only be
accomplished through the overcoming of the particular-universal dichotomy. His thesis
is theistic. It places the universe at a distance from ourselves, and asserts our inability to
ever fully comprehend it. He also therefore sentences us to eternal suffering; as finite,
particular minds, we will never be able to approach the end of our limitation, and every
reminder will cause us pain. Some historians, like those mentioned who have already
explored the philosophical nature of the particular-universal tension, have already arrived
at some agreement with Tolstoy in that regard. They view our particularity as final,
unchangeable, and to overcome it as undesirable in most philosophical circles. History is
written for its own sake and in order to maintain the bourgeois status of academia. In this
regard, historians are in direct conflict with Tolstoy. By continuing to write historical
narratives, historians proliferate some idea of freedom and agency unavailable to most of
society. History serves no greater purpose for our species; the chronicles of suffering we
hold, of which War and Peace is analogous, are recounted without the purpose of
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bringing our species to a greater state of being. We neither attempt to push humanity into
a universal state of being, an effort which Tolstoy opposes, nor do we advocate the
eradication of the desire for freedom, which Tolstoy tried to do in War and Peace. We
instead maintain the status quo, one of inevitable suffering and the illusion of escape
from that suffering through individual, particular effort. We have transformed our
discipline from a pursuit of knowledge to one of bourgeois limbo, chaining ourselves to
suffering, death, and the tyranny of self-interest.
But there are other potentialities, which I wish to explore in this work. I grant
Tolstoy that he identified a serious problem in history writing, that is, self-interest and the
particular, but dismiss his pessimism. I see no reason to believe that we are all
determined to the particular. I do not think that removing the possibility of our own
freedom of self-determination as beings is constructive. Why would we bother to act, to
imagine, to work, to think, if it were true that those activities could have no impact on the
world? Why not give in to base instinct, interact with the world in a purely superficial
manner, and abandon all hope for any greater possibilities? That is the inevitable end of
pessimism: apathy, inactivity, and eventually violence, suffering, and destruction. We
will abandon ourselves to a Heideggerian state, one in which there can be no moral
wrong or right, no goal, and nothing beyond our own contemplation of suffering. We
would be forever particular. Those of the conservative left, who draw greatly from
Heidegger through thinkers like Foucault, would sentence us to the same. Foucault does
not even retain any solution; he protests all attempts at a dominant narrative, even one of
peace. The thoughts of Foucault can only lead to a so-called negative norm, in which
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there can be nothing but critique of narratives vying for hegemonic power in praise of our
individual and collective ignorance, an essentially non-constructive and pessimistic
condition. Tolstoy’s argument does not convince me, much less Foucault’s, whose
argument ignores even the possibility of peaceful submission to universal powers; if
Tolstoy wished to convince me that our actions have no impact through will on the
future, then taking action to persuade me to act in a certain way was a mistake. But I
cannot deny that Tolstoy puts his finger on a central problem with the historical
discipline. Self-interest, which plagues history as much today as it did 150 years ago, is
certainly a problem. The historical discipline is bourgeois, and our narratives reflect that.
We write for other historians, not the general public. Our narratives embrace no truth to
work toward for our species, only the endless cycle of fact discovery, the slow atrophy of
intellectualism fueled by empiricism rather than effort for a metaphysical end.
Tolstoy’s solution to these problems is not mine. Tolstoy would have us embrace
our particularity, and submit ourselves to the all-governing natural laws of the universe so
that our course as a species may be characterized by peaceful passivism rather than any
activity which may prove destructive. He scorned the historians of his time, the Rankians
and Hegelians, who in all their German idealist sincerity believed in a determined
positive end for our species that was manifested in our actions. He would also scorn the
historians of today, who just as much as Ranke believe in the raw, discoverable fact,
despite their loss of attachment to the grand, political narratives of nations and “history as
it really was,” so beloved to many historians Tolstoy would have read. But to scorn
positivity is no constructive act, and I disagree conclusively with Tolstoy in his
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determined pessimism. I believe in the possibility for positive ends for our species, that
we may triumph over our particularity, and change the state of our being. I thus turn to
the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, to the radical Enlightenment principles of equality,
freedom, and attainment of the universal, though I do so with some departure from that
tradition. The Hegelian-Marxist tradition posits the possibility for human freedom, for
peace, for the end of suffering and even death, in this world, without gods, mythos, or an
afterlife. It may instead be achieved through our own actions. This is praiseworthy. But
significantly, those traditions often emphasize their own determinism; humanity will be
the manifestation of Reason in the world through the motions of the World-Spirit, will
overthrow capitalism and install a global communist community. Such determinism is
yet more condemnation for the human, though they are much preferable to the sentences
of Tolstoy, Heidegger, and Foucault. I see no need for a determined truth, a truth that
exists with or without our will for it to be. I instead assert that our truths are those we
will them to be, and our future will follow from those truths that we will. That is my
departure; I do not believe in the inevitable culmination of Reason through the
manifestation of the World Spirit, nor do I believe in the linear evolution of human
civilization into the final state of communism.
Our state of being will be what we determine it to be. And the end which is
worthy of such a possibility, the goal which would solve the problems that Tolstoy
pointed out, not just within the historical discipline, but within our species, is perfect
universality. It is the unification of our species, that which wills as it is, with all that is.
It is the overcoming of suffering, fear, division, violence, and, ultimately, death; in short,
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it is to become god. Our access to perfect universality will be achieved via will; the will
to be self-defining, the will to choose one’s being, to become without restriction of
possibility, is universal because it is limitless. The continued efforts toward mastery of
the universe, labor combined with focused intention, in order to fulfill our will to
become, at present manifest in the sciences, is the practical path by which we may
achieve that universality. History may serve in the philosophical path toward
universality, which by necessity will only come through the complete unity of our
species. We will first be unified in purpose, then being, and then with all that is. I
propose that a reconstructed history would serve excellently to persuade humanity’s
individual members of the worthiness of universality. We, as new historians, desire
peace and the end of suffering; to achieve those ends we must convince others that to be
individual is to suffer, and that to overcome individuality and suffering toward the
universal is not the end of the human, but merely a transition to a different state of
existence for that which wills, one which is better because it fulfills the moral imperative
to overcome our own violences. That moral imperative will be satisfied through love,
love most similar to that exhibited by Christ himself; our love, the love of and for all, is
manifest in self-sacrifice. The will to give up our individual selves for the sake of our
entire species, for all those who will to freely, voluntarily undergo the transformation into
a single will, to experience self-sacrifice and the end of the individual not unto death, not
unto oblivion, but unto all others of our species, is love. It will be the last violence we
experience as individuals, the violence of transformation into a single entity. New
historians may act as the agents for such a change.
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We are the keepers of humanity’s failures, sorrows, sins, and disasters. Who else
could serve better to entreat the other members of humanity to seek a better existence, to
escape the inevitable suffering and violence we inflict on ourselves and others? It is true
that all our narratives are constructed, as Hayden White wrote decades ago, and it is true
that all our narratives serve our own interests, as Tolstoy mockingly noted time and
again. But if we united under a single goal, if we subsumed the interests of our
individual selves to the interests of our species, and used the chronicle of suffering that is
human history to encourage humanity to reach for the universal instead of wallowing in
the particular, we can be part of a greater project to overcome our very being. If we give
up bourgeois life, epistemological pessimism, and existential complacency, and instead
offer ourselves for the services of the species, we could serve as the proselytizers of a
different kind of religion: the new history of universality. To introduce the new history, I
begin by dissecting Tolstoy’s critique of historians in Chapter 1. I divide his critique into
three different mockeries: the mockeries of the actor, the narrator, and the narrative. At
the end of the chapter, I give a brief evaluation of the critique, essentially deciding what
of it is worth engaging with in order to restructure history along Marxist lines. Chapters
2 and 3 are two different historiographical excursions. In Chapter 2, I evaluate the way
Tolstoy’s critique has been received and judged since War and Peace was published,
broken into two parts, the mistakes of omission and the mistakes of interpretation. In
Chapter 3, I give a brief historiographical survey of how historians have thought about
the historical discipline in light of the particular-universal tension in the first part,
followed by two examples of historical monographs written with the particular-universal
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tension in mind in recent years. In Chapter 4, I argue for the new history, informed and
constructed by Tolstoy’s polemic as well as the historiographies I cover in Chapter 2 and
3. I propose a way outside of both Tolstoyan pessimism and Marxist determinism in
order to achieve peace and freedom for humanity, a way for which a new history will
prove useful.
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CHAPTER ONE
TOLSTOY AND HISTORY
Napoleon and the Mockery of the Actor
The first time the narrator of War and Peace directly attacks historians is at the
beginning of the the third volume, six hundred pages in. Andrei has already nearly died
at Austerlitz, Natasha has spurned Andrei for a brief but intense affair with Anatole, and
Pierre has tried on the Freemason apron. The bones of the story have been built, and the
main characters have already undergone life-changing occurrences. The key historical
event of the novel, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, is the focus of the polemic, and
Tolstoy introduces his topic of interest with considerable contextual argumentation.
Quite directly, the narrator asks: “What produced this extraordinary event? What were its
causes?"2 They proceed to list the set of causes that historians of the time (the 1860s)
generally set upon, a relatively unimportant list of other events and facts which hardly
feature in the story at all, such as the theft of the duchy of Oldenburg, vague diplomatic
errors, etc. But what relevance, the narrator asks, have such abstract and distant events to
do with the invasion itself, in which “thousands of men from the other end of Europe
should kill and ravage the people of Smolensk and Moscow provinces and be killed by
them?”3 They find that there is no satisfactory answer, and thus begins their direct attack
on historians. “For us descendants—who are not historians, who are not carried away by

2
3

Tolstoy, War and Peace, 603.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604.
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the process of research and therefore can contemplate events with unobscured common
sense—a countless number of causes present themselves . . . equally correct in
themselves, and equally false in the incapacity . . . to produce the event that took place.”4
The narrator is unimpressed by attempts from historians to explain the invasion.
According to them, historians go about it all wrong, attempting to attribute causes for
particular occurrences to other particular notions, whether individuals, actions, or events.
There can be no particular causes in history. Instead, there are “billions of causes”
coinciding, none of them “the exclusive cause of the events, but the event had to take
place simply because it had to take place.”5 The narrator goes on to clarify exactly what
they mean by necessary events: “Fatalism in history is inevitable for the explanation of
senseless phenomena . . . the more we try to explain sensibly these phenomena of history,
the more senseless and incomprehensible they become for us.”6 Naturally, in such a
destructive narrative to the great men version of history that still had some popularity in
the mid-nineteenth century, Napoleon can only feature as a clown, the focus of the
novel’s direct attack on agency. The narrator states that in 1812, when deciding whether
or not he wanted to go to war with Russia, he was deciding nothing, neither his fate nor
the fates of all those who would be affected during the invasion. Rather, Napoleon “had
never been more subject than now to those inevitable laws which forced him . . . to do for
the common cause, for history, that which had to be accomplished.”7

4

Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 604-605.
6
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 605.
7
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 606.
5
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The mockery of Napoleon in War and Peace is the most severe criticism of a
single character featured in the novel; when he appears, he serves only to demonstrate his
own ridiculous egoism and self-absorbed behaviors. His first scene is just before the
battle of Austerlitz, a rout of the Russian forces for which Napoleon credits his genius the
victory. His first appearance is without dialogue; the narrator only provides a physical
and emotional description of Napoleon’s state. He is content with his morning, happy
that the anniversary of his coronation could align with a battle he predicted to be a
victory. He only gives the order for the battle to begin once the early morning sun has
illuminated the grounds for the coming engagement; to him, it was only possible for the
thousands of men who were going to die within hours to do so once he was satisfied that
the aesthetic appeal of the setting was adequate for his desires. Such drama and selfobsession is nearly unimaginable in the face of the horror that then took place, during
which Napoleon himself was not in danger. He tours the field of battle afterwards,
surveying the dead and wounded of both sides, and encounters Prince Andrei, who is near
death and surrounded by other wounded.
Prince Andrei, heretofore an admirer of Napoleon, had been much the same in his
desire for glory on the battlefield. Before the battle began, Andrei was thinking out his
own battle plans, deciding how he would direct the actions of troops in order to achieve
victory and bring himself glory. During the battle, when the Russian line is breaking and
Andrei sees the standard fall, Andrei sees an opportunity to gain that glory by leading his
battalion in a charge against the French, barely able to hold up the heavy standard as he
did so and immediately being struck down. As Andrei falls, he understands that he is
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approaching an infinite; whether it is the sacredness of life or death itself, or some
synthesis of the two, is unclear. What he sees in the eternal sky could be neither, but is
only brought about by his nearness to death and intense awareness of life. Andrei
remains in contemplation of the infinite sky for hours, still bleeding, after the French
victory has been secured. When Napoleon comes upon him, severely wounded and
barely conscious, Andrei knows that Napoleon is there, and hears Napoleon say the
words: “There’s a fine death.”8 Napoleon, of course, believes that he is giving Andrei’s
death meaning with the compliment, as if an egotistical honor from some other mortal
creature could bestow an immortal element upon a dying man. Andrei ignores him,
remaining in contemplation: “He knew that it was Napoleon—his hero—but at that
moment, Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant man compared with what
was now happening between his soul and this lofty, infinite sky.”9
Some of Tolstoy’s most beautiful prose in War and Peace is reserved for Andrei,
in particular the times when Andrei approaches death. The implication of reverence for
the awareness of life and death that Andrei had reached was only disrupted by
Napoleon’s appearance. After Napoleon orders Andrei to be taken for first aid and
Andrei wakes with more consciousness of his situation, Napoleon comes by the hospital
to pay his fallen enemies more honor. When he reaches Andrei’s bed and asks after his
condition, Andrei could not even respond: “all this interest that occupied Napoleon
seemed so insignificant, his hero himself seemed so petty to him, with his petty vanity

8
9

Tolstoy, War and Peace, 291.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 291.
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and joy in victory, compared with that lofty and just, and kindly sky, which he had seen
and understood, that he was unable to answer.”10 Napoleon does not comprehend
Andrei’s lack of response, and simply moves on to other soldiers, eventually leaving on
his horse happy with the recognition his personage had given to the wounded and
defeated.
Napoleon’s self-obsession is also illustrated at the beginning of the French
invasion of Russia, when his forces cross the Niemen River. A regiment of Polish
uhlans, excited by Napoleon’s presence on the bank of the river, receive order to find a
ford and cross. The colonel in command of the unit, “stumbling over his words with
excitement,” is driven to such zealous rapture that he begs for the uhlans to be allowed to
cross the river without a ford, hoping to demonstrate some prowess and make an
impression on the Emperor.11 When given permission by an adjutant, the uhlans charge
into the water to disaster; dozens of men and horses drown, despite the presence of a ford
a quarter mile away. But these worshippers are “proud to swim and drown in this river
before the eyes of the man who sat on a log and was not even looking at what they were
doing.”12 Napoleon later names the colonel to the Legion of Honor, which was,
naturally, headed by Napoleon himself. Aside from encouraging such ridiculous, selfdestructive behaviors from his own officers, it is also remarkable to see how the narrator
portrays Napoleon’s attitude to such rapturous performances: “For him it was no new
conviction that his presence at all ends of the world, from Africa to the steppes of
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Muscovy, struck people in the same way and threw them into the madness of selfoblivion.”13
Napoleon possesses unparalleled confidence and self-satisfaction when events
favor his desires. The French victory at Austerlitz, his situational superiority over his
defeated enemies and subordinates, all enabled him to feel as though he was in control.
As the invasion of Russia progresses, and events cease to manifest themselves as he
wishes, his sense of control, and thus his confidence as portrayed in the novel, wane. The
first time Napoleon begins to sense that his unshakeable certainty in his ability to shape
the world may be unwarranted is at the Battle of Borodino, the most significant battle of
the invasion. The Russian army, under command of Grand Marshal Kutuzov, had
retreated from Napoleon along the roads to Moscow, and gave battle just before the city.
Generally considered one of the casualty-heaviest battles in history up to that point,
Borodino saw tens of thousands of casualties for both French and Russian forces. The
Russian army chose to pull back after the action, and after significant debate retreated
beyond Moscow, giving up that city without giving up the war.
In the view of the narrator, Borodino was a victory for Russia, or perhaps more
accurately a defeat for Napoleon. His army was much reduced and exhausted for
resources, and fell to looting and disorder shortly after Moscow was taken. Tolstoy
provides a view of Napoleon that is far removed from the pomposity and arrogance the
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emperor felt earlier in the text as Napoleon learns of the numbers of casualties in the
French forces and their inability to completely overwhelm the Russian position:
Napoleon was experiencing a painful feeling similar to that which is always
experienced by a lucky gambler, who madly threw his money about, always won,
and suddenly, precisely when he has calculated all the chances of the game, feels
that the more he thinks over his move, the more certain he is to lose. The troops
were the same, the generals were the same, there were the same preparations, the
same disposition, the same proclamation courte et énergique, he himself was the
same, he knew it, he knew that he was even much more experienced and skillful
now than he was before, even the enemy was the same as at Austerlitz and
Friedland; but the terrible swing of the arm fell magically strengthless.14
Napoleon’s agency was taken from him; his will was not made manifest in the world, his
enemies did not fall before him despite all his knowledge, skill, and experience. His
defeat of the Russian army at Borodino did not gift him Russia’s surrender, and only
served to weaken his own forces while engendering greater hatred against his cause in the
Russian people.
Napoleon firmly believes that Moscow would be formally handed over to him,
and that peace negotiations (during which he would demonstrate his goodwill and
civilized principles) would be initiated to end the war he had not even wanted. The
narrator lists all the things that Napoleon wishes to accomplish in the city, among them
designing a speech to the official deputation to receive him into the city and listing the
ways he intends to name the charitable institutions in Moscow after his mother. The
gentlemen of Napoleon’s suite fear to tell their emperor the news; they are aware that the
city is empty, but are so afraid to place Napoleon in “that dreadful position known to the
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French as le ridicule” that no one speaks to him.15 He eventually notices that the moment
for a triumphant speech has passed, has the troops move in to take the city, and after
officially being informed that Moscow was empty, grumpily retires to an inn in a suburb
outside the city. The portrayal of Napoleon is as both an actor (or pretender) and a child.
He is an actor in that he attempts to engage in a line of action that will have purely
theatrical results. His thoughts on why he entered into the war, his carefully prepared
speech, and his plan to justify peace terms favorable to himself have little to do with
anything anchored in reality. He entered the war, wanted to give a magnanimous speech,
and hoped for favorable peace terms for reasons of self-interest; reliance on principles of
civilization versus barbarity, the justification he imagined to use when describing his
actions in the war to the non-existent deputation, is merely an excuse to attain more
political standing and ascend further in the hierarchy of men. Thus he is an actor on a
stage whose moment never comes, completely ignored by the Russian people, who are
intent on continuing the war. He is also a child in that he presumes there exists a set of
circumstances, which he desires, without having any evidence of that state of affairs
existing. His expectation is that Moscow will be formally given to him and its
governance transferred to his control, and that there he will begin peace negotiations with
Russia. Neither of those circumstances exists, and the fear of his suite to tell him the
truth marks him as childish. Rather than take in stride events as they come to him, he
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expects events to occur according to his will time and again, and time and again makes
himself a fool (le ridicule) as the invasion diverges from his vision.
The Mockery of the Narrator
Just as Tolstoy mocks the actor who supposes to have the power to influence the
outcome of history, so does he mock the historian who supposes to understand the
reasons for historical events. There is, of course, a set of wry notations the narrator
makes concerning the biases of historians, especially concerning why the invasion
happened, and how events like the Battle of Borodino may be interpreted. National
identity inevitably raises its head; the aforementioned set of explanations for the cause of
the invasion include a laundry list of possibilities convenient for any given perspective.
Napoleon himself believed the war was started by the “intrigues of England,” and
conversely to the English by “Napoleon’s love of power.”16 When Moscow burns, blame
is tossed back and forth by Russians and French, both attempting to demonize the other
for attempting to destroy an ancient and sacred city out of either the too-fierce patriotism
of the Russians or the “savagery of the French.”17
There are also other, more individual biases to consider; the narrator often directs
their attacks on historians who seek to support the great man interpretation of history,
who naturally favor Napoleon and his individual agency. Introducing the Battle of
Borodino, the narrator calls both Kutuzov and Napoleon fools for accepting battle; it
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proved disastrous for both, though more so for the French. The narrator is more
sympathetic toward Kutuzov, since Kutuzov represents the ideal of Russian spirit and
maturity, patient and reluctant to engage aggressively with the enemy. But both are
nevertheless moved by the same unintelligible forces that shape all events: “In offering
and accepting battle at Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and
senselessly. And only later did historians furnish the already accomplished facts with
ingenious arguments for the foresight and genius of the commanders, who, of all the
involuntary instruments of world events, were the most enslaved and involuntary
agents.”18 The narrator completely counters the traditional narrative of historians.
Kutuzov did not cunningly retreat until a strategic point at which to give a battle he knew
would result in a Pyrrhic victory for Napoleon, or bumble his way into making a mistake
by losing a third to a half of his army. Napoleon did not ingeniously chase Kutuzov with
the goal of stopping at Moscow to finish the war, or sacrifice the quarter of his army at
Borodino that he thought necessary to break the spirit of the Russians and finish them off
in the countryside beyond Moscow. These arguments are constructions generated by the
egos and interests of later historians, who are willing to ascribe some kind of genius to
humans reacting to everything around them, rather than embracing the subservient
position of humans in the natural order according to Tolstoy’s urging.
The narrator expounds on the criticism of great men and generals after the Battle
of Borodino takes place. They detail specifically how ridiculous it is to assume any
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commander is in control of the events of war: “The activity of a commander does not
have the slightest resemblance to the activity we imagine to ourselves, sitting at ease in
our study . . . a commander in chief always finds himself in the middle of a shifting series
of events, and in such a way that he is never able at any moment to ponder all the
meaning of the ongoing event.”19 The commander has, by necessity, an incomplete
account of the facts as they are coming to them, and constantly hears directly
contradictory accounts, especially during battle. The commander‘s lack of knowledge,
but necessity to act, is reminiscent of both the tragedy of human agency already framed
by the novel, and analogous for the effort of the empirical historian. Historical facts
exist, but their meanings are constantly being transformed and shaped by events
occurring within the passage of time. Just as the commander attempts to develop orders
and strategies to address the facts as they understand them, but is unable to develop
foolproof strategies, so the historian attempts to write accurate histories without knowing
all the facts or their complete meanings. Both are the result of the desire for meaning to
be derived from human agency. The commander wants to win the battle and influence
the future, and in the same way the historian wants to produce a significant work for
future historians. The futility of the actor is similar to the futility of the narrator, and both
emerge from self-interest.
The futility of Tolstoy’s historical narrator is derived from both their methods and
their motives. Methodologically, the historian writes histories based on the existence of
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empirical facts. If history is constructed from facts alone, which are understood as single
units of information that refer to a specific moment in time, and describe or are related to
historical events and persons, then the fault of empirical historians is twofold. First, in a
practical sense, there exists the problem of limited perspective and information.
Archives, the storehouse for the materials of the historian, are inevitably incomplete;
documents and evidences are lost or destroyed, or nonexistent about a relevant historical
event in the first place. The result is a loop of disciplinary effort: the historian goes to the
archive, uncovers a heretofore unknown fact about an historical event or figure (although
still lacking a complete knowledge of their subject), and writes a new history about that
event or figure incorporating the new fact. Often, of course, this is not the case. The new
fact can’t be found, so the historian will work to reinterpret the old facts, which are still
limited, and assigns themselves/is assigned to a school of thought concerning their
particular method or viewpoint. The historian will thusly be regarded as having still
accomplished the goal of history by using facts to substantiate a new narrative.
Throughout this process, no one who is taken seriously suggests finding a way to reach a
true, final conclusion about anything historical. There is the general presupposition that
there are multiple truths, with differing validity based on the amount of used facts and
political popularity, a conclusion inimical to Tolstoy’s determinist conviction. In an
empirical system, anything less than multiple truths supported by facts is a single truth,
which is either religion or childish nonsense, and anything more than truths beyond just
individual facts is postmodern relativism, lacking in both logical coherence and moral
soundness. But the remaining procedure is an infinite loop of gradually deteriorating
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authority. The historical discipline utilizing the empirical method lacks an end and
creates the conditions for the rise of bureaucratic careerism. Without a universal truth to
provide the guiding light for the efforts of historians, self-interest and the desire for a
closed off community develop within the discipline. Historians become concerned with
questions relevant only to other historians, write most chiefly for other historians, and
focus ever more on niche historical events in and of themselves, without attempting to
discover certain truths. Historians, writes Tolstoy in the epilogue of War and Peace,
“without answering the essential questions of mankind, for some sort of purposes of their
own, serve as current money for the universities and the mass of readers—lovers of
serious books, as they put it.”20
The second problem that Tolstoy raises for empirical historians is with regards to
the nature of the fact being opposed to the nature of the human species. The fact, at least
nominally, refers to a single point in history. It describes a finite extant thing or set of
things, and is supposed to exist alongside other facts so that historians can attempt to
reconstruct them to understand the past. But, the narrator asks, how useful is such a
thing? Is it even compatible with the rest of our knowledge of how things work? Their
conclusion is that the fact is similar to the unit of space described in Zeno’s paradox of
Achilles and the tortoise. According to the Ancient Greek philosopher, if Achilles and
the tortoise begin walking while the tortoise is ahead and both are continuously moving,
even though Achilles is far faster, Achilles can never catch the tortoise. As Achilles
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covers half the distance, the tortoise will add more distance, and so on forever; Achilles
cannot cover the apparently infinite distance that the tortoise will inevitably keep
generating as it moves. This paradox was meant to explain that motion and change are
illusory; Zeno’s belief was that the universe is static. Similarly, if the historian is
consumed with the apparent infinite variety of individual facts as units, it will seem as
though historical truth is illusory. After roughly two millennia of development in
mathematics, calculus was invented by independently by both Isaac Newton and
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the mid-17th century. The purpose of calculus, as the
narrator delights in at the beginning of the third part of the third volume in War and
Peace, is to mathematically describe motion, thus enabling mathematicians to refute
Zeno’s paradox.
History, according to the narrator, can be thought of in the same way. Facts can
analogously be thought of as units of motion, as in calculus. But the investigation of
calculus is not the particularities of individual units of motion, but rather the laws and
governing principles which hold sway over motion itself. The presumption behind such
universal laws is that all the instances of motion are connected. The narrator assumes
that the movements of history function similarly: “The movement of mankind,
proceeding from a countless number of human wills, occurs continuously. To
comprehend the laws of this movement is the goal of history. But in order to
comprehend the laws of the continuous movement of the sum of all individual will,
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human reason allows for arbitrary, discrete units.”21 The efforts of modern historians,
according to the narrator, have focused too much on individual instances in history rather
than attempting to make sense of the whole of history at once. This error is due to an
imagined separation between the existences of historical facts: “but however small the
units that history takes, we feel that allowing for a unit that is separate from another,
allowing for the beginning of some phenomenon, and allowing for the notion that all
individual wills are expressed in the actions of one historical person, is false in itself.”22
The narrator thus urges historians to understand history mathematically rather than with
the isolation of individuals in mind.
The preservation of individual analysis in historical methodology, rather than
turning to a universal mathematics, implies a motivation for writing history which
presupposes a desire for a history that assumes the freedom and influence of the
individual agent. Assuming, as the narrator does, that history is determined, bound to
natural laws outside human influence, then all human action is devoid of meaning. There
can exist no great men to shape the world for future generations and who live forever in
the glory of collective memory. There can be no historical accounts or analyses to
change the way a historical topic is understood. All the efforts of historians to engage in
empirical study and “fix” the histories that were previously written are childish assertions
of an agency that does not exist. All these efforts are, for Tolstoy’s narrator, mere errors
in the course of what nature has set out for our species. Action cannot lead where natural
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law will take us anyway, and it certainly cannot take us outside the parameters of those
laws, if we are indeed ruled by them. Thus the evaluation of historians Tolstoy directly
illustrates in Part II of the epilogue, dropping the voice of the narrator, concerning how
historians engage in their discipline. It is worth reading again with greater context. He
defines historians who study the movements of people over time, or historians interested
in political narratives and cultural changes, thusly:
General historians and historians of culture are like people who, having
recognized the inconvenience of paper money, decide instead to make coins out
of a metal that lacks the density of gold. And the money will indeed come out
having the clink of coin, but only the clink. Paper money might still deceive the
unknowing, whereas a coin that clinks but has no value will deceive no one. As
gold is only gold when it can be used not for exchange alone, but also for real
things, so, too, general historians will only be gold when they are able to answer
the essential question of history: what is power . . . And as tokens that resemble
gold can only be used among a group of people who agree to take them for gold,
and among those who do not know the properties of gold, so, too, general
historians and historians of culture, without answering the essential questions of
mankind, for some purposes of their own, serve as current money for the
universities and the mass of readers—lovers of serious books, as they put it.23
The currency-based analogy Tolstoy uses to describe the motivations of historians
reflects his sense of the self-interest that energizes the historical discipline. He is quite
dismissive of historians and their serious books that ask all the wrong questions, and sees
little to be gained from histories that focus on only a few people. The interest of such
histories is to suppose that the source of power in history to cause events cannot be but
vested in individuals, and thus constitutes a discipline-wide error.
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To err from the natural course of history is always an act of selfishness. To
enfold one’s self into the ultimate purpose of natural law and end childish self-assertion
would be to take Tolstoy’s words to heart. To laud the individual and assert their power
to have influence on events; what could there be more self-interested? It is a political
endeavor, an endeavor to escape natural law for the sake of one’s own self. Histories of
those deemed interesting, influential, important, who had meaning in their lives worth
learning from after their death; these are all manifestations of the desire for agency in a
world empty of freedom. Historians sense their inner desires to assert themselves on the
world, recognize that others feel the same way, and write histories satisfying to those
desires. To Tolstoy, what could such a historical discipline be but a group of selfaggrandizers, advertising freedom in their so-called “serious books?” They develop a
vocabulary exclusive to their community and create a body of works that is substantially
difficult for the rest of society to access because of paywalls and membership restrictions.
They have control over what gets published as history through community self-regulation
and disciplinary politics, and choose their own successors by having significant control
over the education of future historians. Tolstoy’s antipathy towards the early form of the
modern historical discipline developing during his lifetime is unobscured in War and
Peace; in the analogy from the epilogue he bluntly calls historians forgers and liars,
effective enough only to trick the ignorant.
The historian may be forgiven for asking how Tolstoy justifies the polemic he
delivers in War and Peace. Tolstoy’s criticism focuses on the elements of self-interest he
finds influential in history. However, a perceptive reader might point out that Tolstoy’s
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polemic itself is an act of self-assertion. The very act of writing, one may argue, is a
form of self-assertion, or worse, according to Tolstoy’s supposed adherence to natural
law, a form of self-preservation in opposition to natural law. For what desire would he
take the trouble to write a novel over a thousand pages long, have it published and
distributed, and have the gall to criticize someone else doing the same thing, if not the
desire to be read? Tolstoy still asserts his own voice and views, and if he hopes to be
read after his own death, or to have his published works feature as some sort of memorial
after his death, then the historian may be justified in calling him a hypocrite. Platon
Karataev, Tolstoy’s own paragon of selflessness, would hardly write and publish works
espousing a determined truth. Such an act would have no meaning for someone who
“often said something completely opposite to what he had said before.”24 Another
problem that appears when considering the contradictions of Tolstoy’s work is part of his
own view of the natural course of history. If, as he says over and over, history really is
bound to turn out in one particular way, and we have no freedom, then exactly what does
he suppose to accomplish by writing a polemic about those who supposedly err in
attempting to understand history? If history will be what it will be and events can only
come true in a single way, then why would he attempt to persuade anyone of that truth?
His attempt would garner exactly zero results; persuasion itself is part of the illusion of
freedom. We can only act as nature has determined we will act. Even if everyone in the
world read War and Peace and were convinced to give up their own self-interest, it
would not be because of Tolstoy’s work. It would occur because it would be the course
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of natural law. The line of reasoning that reveals this contradiction in his effort also
illuminates another contradiction: how can anyone err in a determined history? If history
will be what it will be, then the historians he disparages are still serving to that end, and
his polemic serves no purpose other than to feature in the same history alongside all the
works he condemns as useless.
The Mockery of Historical Narrative
The contradictions of Tolstoy’s effort weaken his argument about determinism.
Nevertheless, exactly why he turns to determinism, and how he utilizes natural law to
mock historical narrative, are still worth considering. In the book, the narrator uses
mathematics as their starting point, enamored as they seem to be with Newton and
Leibniz. In the same section the narrator describes the problem with the current historical
profession in the third volume, the narrator likens historical reasoning to scientific
observation of the world:
Peasants say that a cold wind blows in late spring because the leaf buds of the oak
are sprouting, and indeed a cold wind blows every spring when the oak is
sprouting. But though the cause of the cold wind that blows as the oak sprouts is
unknown to me, I cannot agree with the peasants about the sprouting of the oak
being the cause of the cold wind, if only because the force of the wind is beyond
the influence of the leaf buds. I only see the coincidence of conditions that occurs
in every phenomenon of life, and I see that however long and thoroughly I
observe the hand of my watch, the valve and wheels of the locomotive, and the
leaf buds, I will not learn the cause of the bells ringing, the movement of the train,
and the spring wind. For that I must change my point of observation completely,
and study the laws of the movement of steam, bells, and the wind. Historical
science must do the same.25
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The narrator draws the conclusion that if history can be understood mathematically,
wherein the movements of humanity may be better analyzed through a calculus-like set
of formulations which cover the species as a whole rather than considering it to be broken
up between individual factors, then those same formulas must hold true throughout time.
Natural laws (especially in the times of Tolstoy, in which quantum physics and relativity
were yet to be discovered) are consistent across time and are reducible to mathematical
operations. Those basic natural laws, and the hypothetical mathematical formulations
used to describe them, have therefore already determined the course of history into the
future. The narrator is not so optimistic as to say that we may actually predict the future,
but does affirm mathematical analysis of human history in its whole: “No one can tell to
what extent it is given to man to achieve in this way an understanding of the laws of
history; but it is obvious that the possibility of grasping historical laws lies only on this
path.”26
The narrator is thus justified in their attack on the freedom of the characters in the
story by appealing to mathematical, unchanging natural laws. Under the premises given
by the narrator, the conclusion that reveals itself is one that rejects historical narrative.
There can only be, according to the narrator, a single path for history to take, which
humans have thus far made little progress in discovering. Historical accounts have, it
seems to the narrator, been little more than stories about important men who supposedly
did important things. But since agency has already been dismissed as foolishness,
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historical narratives are not works that recount history itself, but are rather self-serving
stories created by historians. The narrator is quite clear to refer to the historical
discipline, as outlined in the aforementioned section on mathematical history, as a
science. The narrator presumes the historical discipline is not about stories, but about the
discovery of indisputable laws that shape its progress. Umbrage is indeed taken with the
deployment of narrative to recount history. Young Nikolai Rostov serves as an excellent
character to make the point.
As a young man at the beginning of the novel, Rostov enlists in the Russian army
as a Hussar, and dreams of glory for himself, his family, his country, and his emperor.
Early in the wars against Napoleon’s France, before the disaster at Austerlitz, Rostov
engages with the enemy on the battlefield. During his first skirmish, when he charges a
French unit alongside other Hussars, he experiences the confusion of battle and is
wounded. His confusion and agitation in the midst of his first battle is so intense that he
doesn’t even remember how he is wounded during the charge. One moment he is
charging on his horse, the next:
“‘What is it? I’m not moving ahead? I’ve fallen, I’ve been killed . . .’ Rostov
asked and answered in the same instant. He was alone now in the middle of the
field. Instead of moving horses and hussar backs, he saw the immobile earth and
stubble around him. There was warm blood under him. ‘No, I’m wounded and
my horse has been killed . . .’ Where ours were, where the French were—he did
not know.”27
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The desperation he feels, the lack of awareness he has of his own predicament, are
brutally communicated. There is no mitigation of his fear as he struggles to identify
where his enemies and allies are, the results of the skirmish. He realizes that the French
are continuing to advance: “He looked at the approaching Frenchmen and, though a
moment before he had been galloping only in order to meet these Frenchmen and cut
them to pieces, their closeness now seemed so terrible to him that he could not believe his
eyes.”28 He is even unable to process how they could be coming to kill him, his childish
perspective still apparent through his own thoughts: “‘Can it be they’re running to me?
Can it be? And why? To kill me? Me, whom everybody loves so?’ He remembered his
mother’s love for him, his family’s, his friends,’ and the enemy’s intention to kill him
seemed impossible.”29 Rostov is pitiful, a child who has no place in the senselessness of
war. His fear, his flight, are painful. There is no honor in the actions of him or those
chasing him. There is only an abject fear of death with which Rostov had previously
been unacquainted. The narrator is thorough in taking advantage of Rostov’s
childishness as Rostov flees the field to the Russian line: “Quickly leaping over the
hedges, with that swiftness with which he had run playing tag, he flew across the field,
turning his pale, kind young face back from time to time, and a chill of terror ran down
his spine.”30
The Rostov that later appears when he recounts the tale of his first skirmish and
injury (a dislocated arm) is quite different. When he, his future brother-in-law Berg, and

28

Tolstoy, War and Peace, 189.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 189.
30
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 190.
29

36

social climber Boris Drubetskoy meet by chance and Boris presses him to tell the story,
the event that Rostov describes is far distant from the daze of fear and confusion he
actually experienced. Rostov gives them a story he feels is expected, in which he
certainly did not fall off his horse, dislocate an arm, and run back on foot. He gives them
a story “of how he got all fired up, forgetting himself, how he flew like a storm at the
square,” cutting down Frenchman with his saber left and right.31 Here the narrator is
surprisingly gentle in their mockery. They assert Rostov’s attempt at genuineness:
“Rostov was a truthful young man, not for anything would he have deliberately told an
untruth.”32 Instead, the problem necessitating a factually inaccurate retelling rests with
his listeners: “If he had told the truth to these listeners, who . . . had formed for
themselves a definite notion of what an attack was, and were expecting exactly the same
sort of account—they either would not have believed him, or worse still, would have
thought it was Rostov’s own fault that what usually happens in stories of cavalry attacks
had not happened with him.”33 Narrative exists in Rostov’s account, certainly, and it
does rely on facts. But the narrative is, by necessity of the context of its recounting, a
self-interested one. Because Rostov maintains himself as the prime beneficiary of the
retelling, his narrative becomes distorted to his benefit. Most obviously he wants to come
off as having conducted himself bravely during the attack. But equally important is his
consideration of how his peers will view his honesty. They would suspect him of lying
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or error if the narrative turned out in a way they did not expect, or at least he fears that
possibility.
The narrator also offers another reason that Rostov’s story turns out differently
from his experience: “in order to tell everything as it had been, one would have to make
an effort with oneself so as to tell only what had been.”34 For events to be retold with
exactitude, no evaluation can occur. Nothing may be given to the events which would
constitute a greater meaning. Events could only ever be described as what they are if
they are to be considered true to their unfolding. Rostov would have had to tell the story
of his first skirmish without consideration of his self-image or the views of his peers. But
narrative always gives values. Narrative is constructed from a particular perspective or
set of particular perspectives, and particular perspectives can only ever be evaluative.
The viewpoint of the particular is to see oppositions and understand the world as broken
apart into distinct aspects to be considered separately. In Rostov’s case, he could not
help but first see the French as targets, then terrifying, battle as first exhilarating, then
confusing and frightful. He can not help but see the judgments of his peers and how
telling his story may impact himself. Rostov is aware of himself as distinct from the rest
of the world, and he tells his story accordingly. The truth of the world, the natural laws
which determine how events will continue to unfold into the future, cannot be described
from a single perspective, and therefore cannot be described with narrative.
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Tolstoy seems to see no substantive ways in which historians and their narratives
are different from Rostov and his. Historians retell events in the past from their
perspective according to their own self-interest and the expectations of their peers.
Historians inevitably have self-interested goals, as the narrator never seems to cease
pointing out, although in the current day less political weight is given to the cause of the
Napoleonic wars. The narratives given then about the worthiness of the wars, who
started them, if Napoleon or the Russian generals were military geniuses, all had political
contexts. Even aside from a broader political value, the narratives given by historians
still serve in the politics of the university and academia. Historians so often live to “serve
as current money for the universities and the mass of readers—lovers of serious books, as
they put it,” to once again quote that biting description. Put in Marxist terms, we pursue
a bourgeois life of contentment by producing narratives that keep us in university jobs
and satisfy the current culture of academia. There is no attempt to pursue a truth, a
unifying element that may bring our species together under the natural law that Tolstoy
holds up high. The narratives given by historians are therefore shallow for Tolstoy. If
anything, Rostov has a greater claim to the value of his narrative. He at least experienced
the event he retells, and invested the safety of his being to be able to retell it. This may
explain why the narrator’s mockery of Rostov feels so gentle in comparison to the bed of
coals they rake historians over.
Evaluation of the Polemic
Tolstoy critiques the historical discipline as primarily motivated by self-interest,
which promotes the pursuit of bourgeois comfort, political maneuvering, and conflict.
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His conclusion that the universe is determined negates the historical actor because
individuals cannot act against natural law. Similarly, the narrator and narrative are
condemned because they concern themselves with the particular rather than the universal.
The stories of individuals are prioritized rather than the forces which manipulate all. The
question that remains is whether the polemic offered in War and Peace is completely
devalued by its internal contradictions. There are three significant problems: Tolstoy’s
personal hypocrisy of self-interest in writing the work at all; the contradiction of
attempting to persuade anyone in a determined world; and the contradiction of how
anyone could act incorrectly, or err, in a determined world.
The first is far less significant than the others. Despite what may be justly
perceived as hypocritical about it, Tolstoy’s work still provides an argument worth
considering. Any argument must be considered on its own, regardless of its origin.
Therefore, we historians must ask ourselves if we produce our narratives out of selfinterest and political pursuits, a question due further consideration later in this work. So
the first contradiction may be dismissed as immaterial. The other two contradictions are
far more serious, and have significant impact on the coherence of Tolstoy’s argument. If
Tolstoy seeks to persuade his readers that there is a problem with the historical discipline,
he must consider it possible for his readers to change their minds, thus enacting change in
the world, as a result of his persuasion. As he points out numerous times in the text, the
idea that any event in the world happens due to the actions of humans rather than
deterministic natural laws is entirely mistaken. He contradicts one of the pillars of his
argument by writing an argument at all. Thus, the whole premise of persuasion is
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dismissible. In the same sense, the foundational point of the polemic against historians,
that they’re doing history incorrectly, lacks any coherence. How could they have been
doing anything wrong if they were determined to do so by natural law? Such a premise
becomes silly given some thought. If Tolstoy had been logically thorough about history
as deterministic, then historians would be fulfilling natural law whether they know it or
not. The common ground for each contradiction is determinist history.
To take the polemic into consideration assumes that we as historians may seek an
understanding of it and attempt to create change within our discipline based on it if we
find it compelling. To do so presumes the existence of agency on our behalf. Therefore,
a serious reading of the text must consider the premise of determinism to be unnecessary.
By disregarding determinism, we are free to take the text seriously and consider change
to our discipline without the contradictions which hold back Tolstoy’s polemic. This is
all well and good, but the next step is to consider whether or not the polemic needs
determinism as a premise to function as a worthwhile critique. The polemic in War and
Peace attacks the notions of agency, the narrator, and narrative. The agent is ridiculous
because they presume to influence future events, even though they are determined. The
narrator (or historian) is ridiculous because they purport to explain a universal set of
occurrences with particular explanations based on self-interest and particular facts. The
narrative is a dysfunctional form of historical recounting because it is also particular
rather than universal. Without determinism, it is obvious that the attack on the agent
lacks the same convincing power. While it may be true that individuals have less
influence on the outcome of events than they often think, to say there is no agency at all
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is too strong a statement to make without the presumption of determinism. The attacks
on the narrator and the narrative, however, are based on more than determinism.
A distinct aspect of the natural laws Tolstoy presumes guide the course of the
universe is their universalism. They are all-encompassing. Nothing can escape their
purview, thus his ability to rely on them to condemn the actor who claims to influence the
future. He also relies on them to condemn the particular, because to prioritize the
particular is to assume an exception to the rule, something that may be considered special
or more important than other particulars. To prioritize the particular inevitably ends in
evaluation and comparison. To prioritize a particular is to engage in self-interest. War
and Peace does few things more frequently than condemn self-interest, especially among
the aristocracy, of which Tolstoy was a part, much to his loathing. The parlor-room
social gatherings devoid of substance, the immense amounts of wealth amassed by the
aristocracy at the expense of the peasantry, Napoleon’s drive to conquer Europe—all
created by the error of self-interest. In Tolstoy’s depiction, self-interest is cancerous and
violent. Even well-intentioned assertions of self, as Pierre’s efforts seem in the epilogue
when he discusses governmental reform, inevitably lead to violence. It appears Pierre
was attempting to convince his family and friends to side with the Decembrists, who in
1825 engaged in what is often considered a leftist revolt against the tsar. The revolt
failed, and its leaders were executed. The reason Tolstoy depicts battle so harshly and
realistically, and mourns his characters as they die from violence, is because of the
disdain for violence that permeates the novel. At the core of Tolstoy’s polemic is an urge
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towards peace, one that asks us to put aside the particular so that we may consider
ourselves as an entity altogether, as a single whole.
Even if Tolstoy’s logical appeal to determinism to support a notion of peace is
weak, it is still in order for us to ask ourselves if we as historians prize self-interest and
the particular rather than the universal, so that we may fully explore the polemic given by
Tolstoy. Do we function as little more than university currency? Are we motivated to
bring our species to a better state of existence, or to make enough money so we don’t
have to worry about bills? Do we write history for the elucidation of all, or to appeal to
readers of serious books? Do we invite conflict rather than work to create a worthy
consensus? Depending on the audience and the conclusion, the question may also then
be asked: Is it true that to prioritize the universal is good? Suppose we do prioritize the
particular and our self-interest over the universal, as Tolstoy would lead us to believe. Is
that wrong, and if so, why?
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CHAPTER TWO
THE RESPONSE TO TOLSTOY
As befits an artist with the cultural impact and esteem of Leo Tolstoy, a number
of publications have been written in response to his style and thoughts. In North
America, there is an entire journal dedicated to him, the Tolstoy Studies Journal, which
has been releasing publications since 1988. Articles about Tolstoy have been published
in numerous other periodicals besides the eponymous one, and there have been countless
books written about his work. As the best known of his works, War and Peace claims no
small share of that publication pie. When War and Peace was first published, and for
some time after, the polemic against history that Tolstoy delivered was, if not ignored, at
least severely downplayed in significance. Isaiah Berlin wrote in 1953 that many who
prioritized Count Tolstoy as a novelist rather than a thinker “have at times looked upon
the historical and philosophical passages scattered through War and Peace as so much
perverse interruption of the narrative, as a regrettable liability to irrelevant digression
characteristic of this great, but excessively opinionated, writer, a lopsided, home-made
metaphysics of small or no intrinsic interest.”35
While this did not stay true, and Berlin’s interpretation of Tolstoy as a pluralist
has proliferated in literary circles, there are two noticeable trends in the analyses offered.
One is negative, in the sense that there have been mistakes of omission. Historians, and
serious considerations of the historical science suggested by Tolstoy, are largely absent
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from the dialogue surrounding War and Peace. That absence is a decidedly strange one,
considering the effort Tolstoy went to ensure his criticism of the historical could not go
unnoticed, going so far as to drop the narrator voice in the second epilogue and speak in
no uncertain terms about the errors of historians. But historians have not taken a great
deal of trouble to respond to his criticisms, leaving that largely to the efforts of literary
critics and philosophers. Equally so, there is little said about actually making an attempt
to switch the focus of the historical discipline from the particular to the universal.
Keeping the status quo of the particular, or at least its approximation, informs the other
important trend, which is one of mistaken interpretation. There is an alarming amount of
written work assuring us that Tolstoy was a pluralist, in part due to Isaiah Berlin’s work,
The Hedgehog and the Fox, as well as other pieces written by the philosophically liberalminded, which assign a sort of Skeptic-lite identity to Tolstoy in War and Peace. For
Tolstoy to have been a pluralist, he would have needed to assert the validity of multiple
narratives as holding some truth, which he emphatically does not. This occurs especially
when the lives of the characters in War and Peace are brought to discussion. Many
readers have interpreted Tolstoy as inconsistent, applying a deterministic worldview only
with national politics and wars while allowing his individual characters (at least those
who are not Napoleon or other important generals) the freedom to shape their lives at
will. By interpreting an allowance for their free wills, those same readers are able to
assert a plurality of truths with regards to the experiences of each individual character.
Both these trends have resulted in the avoidance of the most important aspects of the
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polemic: a serious re-consideration of the historical discipline, and an inquiry into the
value of the universal over the particular.
The Mistake of Omission
It is, of course, difficult to write much about something that does not exist. In
order to provide analysis despite the absence of substantive responses from historians to
Tolstoy, responses from all critics of War and Peace will be utilized instead, regardless
of profession. At the time War and Peace was published, the great man view of history
was still quite popular, and Tolstoy’s attack went largely ignored in the political climate
of the time. Tolstoy scholar and researcher Jeff Love writes: “This romantic view [the
great man view] prospered in the first half of the nineteenth century and offers a ready
justification for autocratic exercises of power, suggesting a fascinating and largely
unappreciated political dimension to Tolstoy’s novel.”36 The notable exceptions to the
silence of historians were military historians, who protested Tolstoy’s apparent
falsification of historical facts regarding battles in the Napoleonic Wars. Russian military
historians S. Navalikhin and A.S. Norov took umbrage with Tolstoy’s treatment of
factual accuracy, as well as Aleksandr Nikolaevich Vitmer, who served in the Russian
army in 1812 and provides the best critique.37 Aside from clarification of factual events
depicted by Tolstoy, the engagement of historians with War and Peace has been absent in
English. Indeed, as philosopher, social theorist, and intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin
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points out, philosophical engagement with War and Peace was absent for the better part
of a century, even while the great man view died off in the historical profession. The
immediate reactions of contemporary critics, that Tolstoy wrote excellent novels but
lacked the abilities of a high-quality thinker, stood for some time. Philosophical
engagement with Tolstoy at all mostly prioritized Tolstoy’s later works, after he
converted to Christianity and turned to religious contemplation. Writes Berlin:
“Historians of Russian thought tend to label this [the assertions of determinism in War
and Peace] aspect of Tolstoy as ‘fatalism,’ and move on to the more interesting historical
theories of Leont’ev or Danilevsky.”38
Boris Eikhenbaum, a Russian-Soviet literary scholar and foundational thinker of
Russian formalism, was the most prominent scholar of Tolstoy’s works through the first
half of the twentieth century. According to Berlin in the 1950s, Eickhenbaum “has
written the best critical work on Tolstoy in any language,” work which informs Berlin’s
own understanding of Tolstoy.39 Eikhenbaum engaged in a large amount of research on
Tolstoy, known as the “Leo Tolstoy project” by Russian language scholar Carol Any.40
The majority of that effort went into the publication of three volumes—named after
different decades of the nineteenth century—charting the interests which motivated
Tolstoy, titled Tolstoi in the Fifties, Tolstoi in the Sixties, and Tolstoi in the Seventies. In
those volumes, Eikhenbaum explores the correspondences Tolstoy kept, the projects he
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worked on, and the interests which arrested him; passages concerning War and Peace are
written in Tolstoi in the Sixties. Eikhenbaum’s thesis is that Tolstoy was at heart an
archaist who disliked the growing historicism of many of his contemporaries, and sought
to subvert them by positing his contradictory philosophy of history. Eikhenbaum’s take
is, much like those of most previous readers of War and Peace, less than impressed.
Eikhenbaum presents Tolstoy as a restless thinker with regards to historical philosophy.
During the 1860s, as academic discussion for the establishment of a formal, unified
historical discipline were intensifying, so too were debates about historical philosophy:
Earlier, with reference to Tolstoi’s conception of The Decembrists, I pointed out a
popular interest in historical books and lectures, in memoirs and biographical
“montages.” This was characteristic of the early 1860s. An interest in the
philosophy of history began at the same time, and had become strong by the mid1860s. This was an interest in generalizations as well as in facts. Of the general
questions which were discussed at the time, two emerged as central: the first was
about how individual freedom and historical necessity are combined, and the
second was about causality in history.41
Eikhenbaum therefore finds little unusual about Tolstoy’s interest in the
philosophy of history, and places him in a rather small camp that developed as the debate
over philosophy of history intensified: “A circle of ‘original’ thinkers was forming ties to
Slavophilism and archaic ‘populism.’ This was a party of archaist-eccentrics in which
the central role was played by Tolstoi’s longstanding friend, S. Urusov.”42 Tolstoy
followed closely the works of Urusov and fellow “archaist-eccentrics” Y. Samarin and S.
Yurev, as well as similar intellectual Mikhail Pogodin. Eikhenbaum analyzes passages
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from those scholars and notes their similarities to some of the passages in War and
Peace. Tolstoy had especially close association with Urusov with regards to the calculus
of history, the laws behind which were inspirational for their intellectual group: “Tolstoi
and Urusov were the leaders of this circle, which was combative and kept up the
traditions of the old Slavophiles; Pogodin was their teacher and authority. They were
carried away by their discoveries of the higher laws of history . . . For them, mathematics
was more than a science; it was a party slogan.”43 In particular, the kind of mathematics
utilized in Tolstoy’s eccentric circle was Newtonian; the universe was uniform and
knowable through patterns gleaned from sufficient observation. Newtonian physics was,
in the lifetime of Tolstoy’s group, being subverted by questions of probability. In
Michael Tondre’s work of literary analysis The Physics of Possibility: Victorian Fiction,
Science, and Gender, Tondre emphasizes the way growing questions in physics about the
nature of uncertainty in the universe (since experimentally substantiated in relativity and
quantum mechanics) were eroding certainty and determinism in literature. He writes
concerning the Newtonian assumption of a universe in which cause and effect is uniform:
”Intellectuals like Bishop Berkely and David Hume noted the purely conjectural nature of
Newton’s particles, and of course departures from Newton’s materialism were widely
available in the two centuries leading up to the 1850s, including the theories of Baruch
Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, and Immanuel Kant.”44 Tolstoy rebelled against this
movement, and thus his strong description and endorsement of a Newtonian, determinist
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history. Eikhenbaum’s conclusion about Tolstoy’s philosophy of history is thus
somewhat dismissive:
The enigmatic sources and the ideas of the philosophical-historical chapters of
War and Peace, including even aspects of style and terminology, are beginning to
become clear. Tolstoi’s philosophy of history turns out to be “original” only in
the sense that it opposes contemporary scholarly and publicistic views, and is the
creation of a circle of “original” thinkers—eccentrics who kept alive the traditions
and ideas of a past era and were antagonistic toward contemporary life. Although
Tolstoi did not avoid historical traumas, he was still the most successful, and
therefore assumed the most active role in this circle. War and Peace assumed the
character of a partisan statement, a declaration on behalf of the
“noncontemporaries.”45

Eikhenbaum’s assessment, however, is far more biographical than it is philosophical. He
passes no judgment on the coherence or applicability on Tolstoy’s philosophy of history,
and offers no analysis of its worthiness. Rather, he assigns the work Tolstoy did to
reconsider the historical science to part of the political movements of the time, an
historicist, empirical fashion of dealing with Tolstoy which avoids any sort of action.
Berlin hoped to take Eikhenbaum’s vast body of research and use it to address the
critique of history in War and Peace with his short work, The Hedgehog and the Fox. In
it he attempts to take Tolstoy’s philosophy of history seriously, and escape the dichotomy
of Tolstoy as either an incredible novelist or Christian teacher. Berlin says that he cannot
help but feel that Tolstoy provides a promising analysis of the historical endeavor.
Tolstoy has too much interest in history, and provoked such strong feelings of
antagonism from “ordinarily sane and sympathetic critics—surely there is something here
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which deserves attention.”46 Despite this declaration of purpose to take Tolstoy
seriously, Berlin quickly begins to make an odd series of assertions. The first is that
Tolstoy only saw epistemological value in empirical facts, and therefore saw history as
only worthy of study if it could create a real history based on the detailed reconstruction
of facts. He comes to this conclusion because of Tolstoy’s dislike for “romanticism,
abstract formulations, metaphysics,” which is somewhat justifiable since the great men
view of history falls under the category of romanticism.47 However, to prioritize the
historical fact as the principle element of Tolstoy’s search for truth in history is counter to
the persuasive argument offered in War and Peace for a mathematical history. That
argument decried the study of the discrete fact in favor of universal natural law, which
Berlin fails to acknowledge.
The failure to acknowledge Tolstoy’s appreciation for the study of universality
extends further. He describes Tolstoy as influenced by the “historicism of his time,” even
though historicism is opposed to any linear or teleological history, which Tolstoy argues
for.48 Berlin later says that for Tolstoy, “History is plainly not a science,” despite
Tolstoy’s specific nomination of the historical discipline as a science.49 Berlin goes so
far as to say, concerning the laws of history, that the sociological sciences “cannot
possibly have found any, because the number of causes upon which events turn is too
great for human knowledge or calculation.”50 Berlin wholly misinterprets Tolstoy’s
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message and ignores his exhortation. Let us revisit that exhortation, and read with
Tolstoy’s narrator Tolstoy’s take on the purpose of the historical discipline:
Any conclusion of historical science, without the least effort on the part of
criticism, falls apart like dust, leaving nothing behind, only as a result of the fact
that criticism selects as an object for observation a larger or smaller discrete unit,
which it always has the right to do, because any chosen historical unit is always
arbitrary . . . Only by admitting an infinitesimal unit for observation—a
differential of history, that is, the uniform strivings of people—and attaining to
the art of integrating them (taking the sums of these infinitesimal quantities) can
we hope to comprehend the laws of history . . . To study the laws of history, we
must change completely the object of observation, leave kings, ministers, and
generals alone, and study the uniform, infinitesimal elements that govern the
masses. No one can tell to what extent it is given to man to achieve in this way an
understanding of the laws of history; but it is obvious that the possibility of
grasping historical laws lies only on this path, and that on this path human reason
has not yet made one millionth of those efforts the historians have made in
describing the deeds of various kings, commanders, and ministers, and in setting
forth their reflections on the occasion of those deeds.51
The political stance behind Berlin’s interpretation becomes clear soon after his
departure from Tolstoy’s argument. He asserts not that Tolstoy truly urged us to search
for the laws of history that govern all men, but to cease that search because we will all of
us, equally, never understand those laws because they are outside our comprehension.
Thus Berlin describes Tolstoy as democratic and egalitarian, but also places upon Tolstoy
the mantle of a negative prophet. Berlin’s Tolstoy believes that humanity is incapable of
understanding the universal laws of nature, and therefore should never even attempt to
seek them. Berlin refers to Tolstoy’s proposal as nothing more than “an ideal historical
science,” worth praise as a beautifully written creation from a master thinker, and then
declares that Tolstoy thought it could never be reached because of human limitation.52
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His evidence for the claim is based on how Tolstoy treats the agency of the characters.
Berlin interprets Tolstoy’s rejection of agency, and disparagement of the characters’ selfobsessions, as an assertion of humanity’s inability to investigate universal natural laws.
While it is arguable that Tolstoy would deny absolute knowledge derived by finite minds,
as scholar Jeff Love will do later, this is not the same as Tolstoy saying that all effort to
explore universal laws is useless. Berlin combines a proclamation of universal fallibility
with the earlier interpretation of Tolstoy as fact driven, resulting in an image of Tolstoy
as a proponent of self-aware ignorance and empiricism. The Tolstoy drawn by Berlin is,
as it turns out, far more similar to the historians disparaged by Tolstoy than the type of
historians capable of creating the historical science envisioned by Tolstoy. Tolstoy’s
science of history assumes the uniformity of human striving in the past as well as a
Newtonian, uniform universe, from which universal laws may be inferred. The historian
who disbelieves in the search for universal laws and only seeks more facts could never
approach natural laws, and would never seek to pursue them. They are the historians
Tolstoy accuses of being forgers, the ones who invent falsified, particular truths when
they think they should abandon pursuing any universal ones. They are the historians who
would be worthless except as currency for universities.
And thus, for Berlin, and for many scholars after him, Tolstoy’s attempt to create
a historical science remained in slumber. Historians persisted to be largely absent from
the discussion, and literary scholars made the most notable efforts to study War and
Peace. Their findings mirrored Berlin’s own. One notable literary scholar, Gary Saul
Morson, posited a particularly negative interpretation of the calculus of history, in which
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Tolstoy’s critique is so complete and impossible to satisfy that it would destroy the
enterprise of historical study. He bases the negativity of Tolstoy’s position on the
unattainability of knowledge in a determinist world:
Tolstoy refuted the usual interpretation of determinism not on metaphysical but
rather on epistemological grounds. He believed that, by their very nature, the
principles governing human events are incomprehensible to the human mind. To
be sure, all events are determined; and, to be sure, if it is once conceded that life
can be governed by reason, then life is impossible. But life is possible, because
reason cannot understand the principles of events and therefore cannot predict as
the underground man fears. Tolstoy’s determinism excludes a “table of
logarithms,” or anything like it. Although determinism is presumably true, it is
totally irrelevant to human life and the practice of historiography. There can
never be a situation where determinism can resolve any sort of problem . . . Thus,
determinism is an entirely empty truth.53

Morson criticizes Tolstoy’s articulation of history because Morson believes it necessitates
complete and total knowledge of all events of the past. It must therefore be a nihilistic
history, as some of Tolstoy’s contemporaries complained, which does not stand to close
inspection. Morson relies on many of Tolstoy’s later writings, after his disillusionment
with writing novels and his turn to Orthodox Christianity, to make the point that even
Tolstoy was not persuaded by the arguments he had given. Thus Morson, who in all
fairness is more concerned with the impact of Tolstoy’s work in War and Peace on
narrative than history, refuses to consider what the historical discipline might be if
Tolstoy’s broader criticisms were to be addressed.
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Despite the vast majority of the reception to War and Peace omitting a serious reconsideration of history, in the last two decades there has been a tonal shift in the
discussion of Tolstoy’s proposal, although historians have continued their absence from
the conversation. The shift is due to the work of scholar Jeff Love, who in 2004
published a re-interpretation of Tolstoy’s effort, Overcoming History in War and Peace.
The second chapter is entirely devoted to explaining and exploring the calculus of
history, framed by an introductory discussion of the Battle of Borodino. The Battle of
Borodino is particularly useful, since it features numerous perspectives of the action
which were then collapsed into a discussion of each character’s inability to see the whole
of the battle or enact change on the outcome of events. Love uses the battle to help
illustrate Tolstoy’s effort to turn history into the subjugation of individual, particularist
narratives and viewpoints to universal laws. While Love does take Tolstoy seriously, and
defends his proposal against its two most prominent detractors, Berlin and Morson, he is,
as a literary critic, more concerned with the potential impact Tolstoy could have on
narrative and art rather than the historical discipline, and thus the serious re-consideration
of history as a discipline is still absent.
This is not to say that Love’s interpretation of Tolstoy as advocating a different
type of narrative is unimportant or useless for the purposes of this paper. Indeed, the
work Love has done has reached outside his own circles. In the August-September, 2005
issue of The American Mathematical Monthly, mathematics professor Stephen T. Ahearn
published a short article about how he utilizes War and Peace in his classroom. Having
been in correspondence with Jeff Love, Ahearn finds the calculus of history to be an
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intriguing concept, and describes the analogy to mathematics to be “rich and deep,
requiring some knowledge of mathematics to fully comprehend their meaning.”54 Ahearn
introduces Tolstoy’s vision for a historical science to his calculus students in order to
reinforce their lessons. He often finds the students easily translate their understanding of
calculus to Tolstoy’s historical ideas, “and few reject Tolstoy’s use of mathematics as
inappropriate.”55 However, the type of narrative Love describes as possible under
Tolstoy’s framework, one which attempts to escape temporality through an integration of
perspectives, of subject and object, finite and infinite, will be more useful for us later on.
The Mistake of Interpretation
The mistake of omission with regards to Tolstoy’s history has, in turn, led to
significant mistakes of interpretation. The interpretive mistake with the most significant
and influential legacy undoubtedly lies within Isaiah Berlin’s Hedgehog and the Fox.
Whereas Eikhenbaum was a loose inspiration for Berlin and is generally less widely read,
Berlin has influenced countless readers to understand War and Peace in a particular way.
He presented Tolstoy as a pluralist, who surrendered to the equal truth of each individual
character’s story rather than be logically thorough with the deterministic world he
described. By omitting a serious consideration of how history might be produced with a
universalist approach, the terms of Tolstoy’s proposal were lost, and were thus lost for
many other scholars because of Berlin’s influence. The interpretation given by Berlin
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also had a broader political dimension, even beyond academia, literary criticism, or the
historical discipline. The Cold War offered a stark context for philosophy, along with the
post-World War II desire for peace and stability. In some ways it is no wonder that
scholars attempted to create knowledge that avoided change, knowledge that would easily
be consumed in a political environment of liberal democracy. And although the historian
may be forgiven for being sympathetic to those who were trying to construct a peaceful
climate as quickly as possible when all the horrors of Nazism, Stalinism, and world war
were so fresh in mind, sympathy does not free us from asking ourselves the same
questions Tolstoy demanded we face, regardless of how conducive to change the answers
to those questions might be.
When the global political setting is taken into consideration, it becomes apparent
that Berlin’s version of War and Peace is driven by an anti-Marxist, pro-liberalism
viewpoint. Berlin sees in Tolstoy an affirmation of the particular because he thinks
Tolstoy celebrates our ignorance as a species by tearing down great men and equating
them with everyone else:
What are great men? They are ordinary human beings who are ignorant and vain
enough to accept responsibility for the life of society, individuals who would
rather take the blame for all the cruelties, injustices, disasters justified in their
name than recognize their own insignificance and impotence in the cosmic flow
which pursues its course irrespective of their wills and ideals. This is the central
point of those passages (in which Tolstoy excelled) in which the actual course of
events is described, side by side, with the absurd, egocentric explanations which
persons blown up with the sense of their own importance necessarily give to
them; as well as of the wonderful descriptions of moments of illumination in
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which the truth about the human condition dawns upon those who have the
humility to recognize their own unimportance and irrelevance.56

Here Berlin delivers to us a strange equality, in which no one of our species stands above
anyone else because all are denied ascent. It is an equality of ignorance and isolation.
We are only at our best when we know that we have no importance and affect nothing.
And, in fairness to Berlin, Tolstoy does declare all of us equally controlled by the
movements of history; that powerful line, “Kings are the slaves of history,” delivered by
Tolstoy near the end of his first polemical essay in War and Peace, comes to mind.57
Berlin’s mistake is equating a recognition of our common ignorance with an affirmation
of that ignorance. He omits the authenticity of Tolstoy’s exhortation that we continue
attempting to find truth despite our ignorance, delivered with such passion and frequency
in War and Peace. He equates Tolstoy’s polemic against those who at that time preached
a false historical gospel with anyone who attempted to find truth:
Tolstoy arrives at no clear conclusion, only at the view, in some respects like
Burke’s, that it is better to realise that we understand what goes on as we do in
fact understand it—much as spontaneous, normal, simple people, uncorrupted by
theories, not blinded by the dust raised by the scientific authorities, do, in fact,
understand life—than to seek to subvert such commonsense beliefs, which at least
have the merit of having been tested by long experience, in favour of pseudosciences, which, being founded on absurdly inadequate data, are only a snare and
a delusion. That is his case against all forms of optimistic rationalism, the natural
sciences, liberal theories of progress, German military expertise, French
sociology, confident social engineering of all kinds.58
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But such a Tolstoy would never bother to write War and Peace in the first place. A
Tolstoy who truly disbelieved in the human capacity to learn and make progress would
not have worked so hard to convince us that there are truths governing the progress of the
world. Berlin pits himself against Marxist ideals of progress and human achievement, as
well as any other system, the natural sciences included, which takes on the responsibility
of change to the human condition. And thus the final conclusion of Berlin’s
interpretation is made clear. It is an interpretation of pluralistic futility, an abandonment
of any hope of progress for peace, a voluntary enslavement to an unidentified god.
Berlin’s analysis has lined up fairly nicely with the course of western academic
influences as well as of the globally political. Few would dispute that the humanities in
the West went through significant trauma in the Second World War, and came out of that
conflict with substantial aversion to any sense of active political radicalism, but more
importantly to any sense of progressive change in the way humans exist. Dropping the
nuclear bombs, the organized efficiency in death camps and utilization of scientific
experiments on humans during the Holocaust, Stalin’s crimes against humanity during
industrialization while espousing the justification of progress; all these were markers of
human technological advancement. But these advancements did not, as according to
modernist sensibilities, result in better living conditions for humanity or promote unity in
our species. And so, out of those traumas, the political sensibilities of the humanities
began to shift, and narratives like the one given by Berlin became immensely popular.
Berlin did not ask us, as the moderns and revolutionary thinkers from the Enlightenment
to the early twentieth century so often did, to challenge what it means to be human, to
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attain mastery over the natural world. Berlin was a preacher of a different sort. Berlin
preached that the impulse to fight our ignorance is so inhuman it should be stifled.
Because we know so little, reaching greater understandings will only result in the
capability to cause more destruction, rather than produce any worthy results for our
species. To make the point, Berlin relied on Tolstoy as someone with great artistic
standing so it could seem as though there was an authority greater than Berlin who had
already delivered the same gospel. The Tolstoy who urged humanity to seek universal
natural law and submit our entire species to those laws is lost, and Berlin casts a Tolstoy
who gave up on any chance for human universality, even the universality of submission.
His strategy largely worked; he appealed to a large number of scholars in the humanities
who possessed the same disposition toward potential progress, and his misinterpretation
became the dominant interpretation of War and Peace in academic circles.
Gary Saul Morson’s interpretation is quite similar to Berlin’s. Morson relies
heavily on Tolstoy in his later life, who became disillusioned with progress entirely, and
Morson conflates progress and determinism to some degree in Hidden in Plain View. He
thus offers essentially the same view as Berlin: that Tolstoy was resigned to some degree
of relativism and, going further than Berlin, that Tolstoy had an entirely negative view of
the historical enterprise. But, as Jeff Love points out in The Overcoming of History in
War and Peace, Morson’s interpretation of the calculus of history is subtly different from
what is actually posited by the narrator:
The problem is to suppose that the narrator means calculus to apply to causes,
“infinitesimally small causes,” as a response to the demand that every single
individual be described in some fashion. If that were the case, then one would
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have little choice but to infer that the narrator’s alleged solution to the problems
of correct, i.e. holistic, historical narrative is empty and, perhaps, even
deliberately so. Alternatively, one could simply hold that the narrator entertains
contradictory points of view in regard to the possibility of knowledge of historical
events. While the narrator clearly advocates the impossibility of obtaining
knowledge by means of the causes of a historical event, he just as clearly does not
leave the matter at that. Instead, he maintains that the proper object of history is
the discovery of the laws that govern history. The unadorned nerve of the issue is
that calculus applies to motion without regard to an enumeration of the relevant
causes —the emphasis is on “how” not “why.”59

Love is able to reconcile the Tolstoy who disbelieves in the human capacity to attain all
knowledge and the Tolstoy who urges us to search for greater laws in history. The
goalposts for Tolstoy’s history, according to the interpretations of Berlin and Morson,
had been moved to perfect knowledge of the entire past. Love moves those goalposts to a
more reasonable and honest position: the search for governing laws of history. In
mathematics, laws are not discovered through the meticulous and infinite process of
subjecting all possible numbers to testing in the laws of mathematics. Laws are inferred
through observation and reason. The same may be true of history, as Tolstoy’s narrator
points out, in a rebellion against the physical uncertainty being discovered by the sciences
and thematically explored in the humanities in Tolstoy’s own time. Such uncertainty
might leave too much room for human action and freedom, antithetical to the submission
urged by Tolstoy.
Even after Jeff Love’s work to reconsider conventional interpretations of War and
Peace, Berlin’s version, as presented in The Hedgehog and the Fox, still remains
dominant. In professor of Slavic literature Hugh McLean’s 2008 In Quest of Tolstoy, he
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concludes the book with the chapter “Foxes into Hedgehogs: Berlin and Tolstoy.” The
chapter is written as an explanation of Berlin’s essay, and draws out the themes Berlin
saw in War and Peace. McLean also offers an analysis of Berlin’s writing, and writes
that the same conclusion Berlin came to about Tolstoy was necessitated by Berlin’s own
personality. He specifically cites pluralism:
The over-arching theory that Berlin-as-hedgehog eventually discovered was
essentially a canonization of foxiness. He gave it the name of “pluralism” . . .
Both liberty and equality are values, but they are at least partly incompatible. As
Berlin puts it, “total liberty for the wolves is death to the lambs.” There is not and
never will be a perfect world where all contradictions will be solved. All efforts
to coerce mankind into a final solution are morally wrong because they present
suffering in the name of abstract and probably unattainable happiness in the
future. The answer, therefore, is compromise.60
McLean’s finding is that Berlin was able to satisfy himself with this conclusion, whereas
Tolstoy continued to live in pain and self-inflicted misery because he was unwilling to
compromise as a Christian in his old age. He affirms Berlin’s interpretation that the
message to be taken from War and Peace is a pluralistic truth that Tolstoy could not hold
onto for long: “It was the image of this Tolstoy, a Tolstoy torn by terrible inner conflicts,
that Berlin perceived so penetratingly and invoked so powerfully at the end of his essay .
. . self-blinded in an intense, decades-long, but ultimately futile effort to stifle the rich,
varied, pluralistic talent he was born with.”61
Philosopher Lina Steiner also offers a pluralistic understanding of Tolstoy in War
and Peace. In 2009, she published the article “Tolstoy, Liberal and Pluralist: On
"Personality" and the Protagonist in "War and Peace," in the journal Russian History.
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Interestingly enough, she does not reference Berlin’s work, but her characterization of
Tolstoy is quite similar to Berlin’s and McLean’s, and seems to follow in a similar
interpretive tradition to that established by Berlin. Steiner’s position is that Tolstoy drew
inspiration for the formation of the protagonists in War and Peace from a strong affinity
for liberal education. She illustrates the trips Tolstoy took to French, German, and
English schools in order to acquaint himself with the forms of liberal education as the
reason for his affinity with the Decembrist revolution, which featured more prominently
in earlier drafts of War and Peace. Pierre Bezukhov, originally named Pyotr Labazov in
those earlier drafts, was loosely modeled on Tolstoy’s own Decembrist relative, S.G.
Volkonskii.62 The reading Steiner presents, based on the way Tolstoy conducted research
into liberal education and began writing War and Peace, is of War and Peace as an
examination of “the rise of modernity in Russia by tracing the development of a modern
individual,” and “to give his compatriots a firm sense of identity and raise their morale by
reminding them about Russian’s [sic] glorious recent past.”63 In other words, Steiner’s
thesis is that Tolstoy wrote the book to advance the ideal of the liberal individual and
portray a nationalistic sense of Russian identity. These, of course, are both particularist,
rather than universalist, goals. She even characterizes Tolstoy’s philosophy of history as
particularist:

The new worldview that Tolstoy develops in the 1860s in conjunction with his
elaboration of the architectonic of his narrative is pluralistic, by which I mean that
Tolstoy no longer presents historical development as a single trajectory in the
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novel, but rather comes to see it as a complex system consisting of multiple
“chronotopes” and multiple intellectual paradigms. History for Tolstoy is no
longer an objective process that unfolds according to any specific predetermined
scenario (that is, on which given the totality of causal factors, would always
unfold the way it does). This indeterminacy makes it a genuine “semiosphere”
populated by various cultural personalities, each of whom possess a unique
project and identity.64

This interpretation is in direct contradiction with the history that Tolstoy describes in War
and Peace. Tolstoy spends a remarkable amount of time establishing history as
deterministic in the novel, and Steiner ignores the calculus of history he formulates and
all the other work he does to criticize the methods of historians. If anything, Steiner’s
approach is even pre-Berlin, in that she intentionally ignores the essay on historical
philosophy throughout War and Peace in favor of a literary analysis of characters. But
her conclusion is nevertheless the same: Tolstoy writes War and Peace as a pluralist with
liberal inclinations, and the way different characters have their own, highly differing
stories with the appearance of agency and influence on their futures is the evidence for
such a conclusion.
There are some works which have attempted to embrace the determinism and
universalism that so many thinkers have ignored or dismissed in War and Peace. In
1962, RF Christian published a book called Tolstoy’s War and Peace: A Study.
Christian’s focus is much more focused on the structures of the book’s writing, through a
“complex series of antitheses, juxtapositions and repetitions” as Jeff Love writes.65 But
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Christian nevertheless affirms “a thoroughgoing determinism which Tolstoy’s
countervailing assertion of individual freedom does not contradict, since, for Christian,
the latter is only a psychological perception, an illusion of sorts.”66 But by far the most
influential writer on a universalist Tolstoy is Jeff Love. Overcoming History in War and
Peace offers a more intensely analytical effort at taking Tolstoy seriously with regards to
a philosophy of history. Love’s thesis lacks the pluralist, liberalist, and defeatist
conclusions of many of his predecessors in Tolstoyan scholarship; instead he argues that
Tolstoy consolidates determinism and human effort, an argument that helps us understand
the apparent contradictions posed by Tolstoy’s reason for writing the book in the first
place. The word he uses to signify the consolidation is “striving.” He describes the
tenuous balance thusly:
The distance of man from God is measured by freedom, an illusion of possibility
and independence that deludes the finite mind to presume well beyond its capacity
and so dooms it to learn by suffering, by recognizing its own limitation, a tragic
shortness of breath. This path of learning, the great rhythm of War and Peace ,
vibrantly echoes the central conflict of Greek epic and tragedy between man and
gods within the thoroughly Christian context of Tolstoy’s field of vision—the
distance between man and God, different orders of being, is the space of
Tolstoyan evil . For Tolstoy freedom and evil are intimately linked. Man’s
illusion of freedom compels him to transgress, to ignore and profane that divine
rationality to which he has scant access; it is the source and primary tool of his
disobedience and the endless struggle that accompanies it. This struggle leads to
pain—enlightenment is always a questionable gift—because through it man learns
of his weakness and dependence, that he is but one “link,” to quote Pierre, in a
great chain of being that he neither originates nor can hope to master. For Tolstoy,
learning is precisely this education in human limitation, the realization that we are
an integral part of a greater whole that functions according to the laws of a deity
that always lies beyond the reach of rational explanation. The path from evil to
good, from ignorance to knowledge, from falsehood into truth is marked by an
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increasing acknowledgment of the mysterious linkage, the astonishing
interconnection, of all living things.67

The basis for Love’s argument, as may be noted in the opening line of his
conclusion above, is the finite mind. The finite mind is individual human’s reason,
capable of understanding the existence of higher laws, but incapable of completely
grasping them in and of themselves because those laws are effectively infinite. But the
finite mind nevertheless continues to strive to understand, a process of learning in which
the finite mind is more and more impressed with its own infinite unimportance as an
individual, and therefore a process that is inevitably painful. As Love notes, human
striving is viewed in different ways throughout the novel. Napoleon’s attempt to
dominate Europe is evil because it arises from the selfish desires of an individual,
whereas the efforts of calculus are held up as a glorious exploration of the universe which
may benefit all. In a similar sense, as Love puts it: “For Prince Andrei freedom is power;
for Pierre it is recognition of powerless, acquiescence to necessity, that allows one to be
freed from the cycle of struggle that characterizes finite existence.”68 Both of the
examples on the far sides of the spectrum, Napoleon and Platon Karataev, symbolize an
incomplete human. Napoleon does not understand humility, and Karataev lacks the
human drive for any understanding of the universal. Thus the determinism of humanity
posited by Tolstoy is not only that we are predestined to live and die in some vague way.
We are determined to ever attempt the impossible, to never be satisfied as finite beings in
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the face of infinite understanding. And so, for Love, Tolstoy does not leave us with an
empty philosophy of history that negates the historical enterprise. Rather, Tolstoy wants
us to know why the historical enterprise exists at all, and encourages us to continue
searching for truth despite our limitations: “That there is no way out, that the whole
cannot be known but also not discarded as a goal of knowledge—here is the animate
force of the novel.”69
It is clear that Tolstoy favors the end of the spectrum on which Platon Karataev
rests. Karataev exists without attachment, divorced from particularity. In the edited
collection of essays Tolstoy on War: Narrative Art and Historical Truth in “War and
Peace,” Love also wrote a chapter, titled “The Great Man in War and Peace.” He gives
closer attention to what Karataev represents for Tolstoy: “Karataev’s life is a life without
partial commitments or ties. In this sense it is a sovereign life—and a most estranged and
estranging one . . . No other character in the novel quite achieves this sovereignty . . .
Karataev represents a wisdom hardly practicable in the world, or, better, hardly tolerable
in the world.”70 But as Love notes, Karataev’s way of life, without particularity or
attachment, is an impossibility for Tolstoy because of our finitude. The human is that
which strives, which exists in the face of the universal with its own particularity
Tolstoy’s perfect solution is the wise man, who “is neither great nor a man. Indeed, he is
neither god nor man, neither master nor slave, neither active nor passive. He retains
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negatively the binary logic of either-or, of excluded middle, in setting that logic aside as
undecidable.”71 Thus Tolstoy’s pessimism is demonstrated; his own paragon of peace
and wisdom is unobtainable. Even the answer humans give to the universal as particular
beings, our efforts to understand it, fall flat, the only possible recourse absolute
submission and negative existence, without particularity or universality. Love’s
description of Tolstoy’s wisdom is nuanced, and gives far greater use in understanding
history. But Love’s analysis is chiefly important for elucidating the failure and
pessimism inherent in that wisdom, providing us with a clear image of the route to be
avoided if a new potential history is to live up to its claims of agency and choice.
It is no exaggeration to say that a great deal has been written about War and
Peace. It is also no exaggeration to say that most of the literature has been quite similar
due to basic mistakes of interpretation: War and Peace is an excellent novel, but far less
excellent as a philosophical work, or can be reduced to a skeptical, pluralistic narrative.
Very little written on War and Peace addresses any sense of the proposal Tolstoy gives to
revitalize the historical discipline; i.e., end traditions of self-aggrandizement, maintain a
higher goal of knowledge to which all historical effort is given, etc. The avoidance of
Tolstoy’s critique is likely due in part to Tolstoy’s position in the midst of the debates on
philosophy of history during his own time, a position of archaism opposed to the
scientific developments occurring in history at the time. Eikhenbaum places Tolstoy in a
very small, eccentric group of people with similar mindsets, and thus the perception of

71

Love, “The Great Man in War and Peace,” 97.

68

Tolstoy’s critique as somewhat embarrassing. In later decades, Tolstoy’s voice fell on
the ears of those with exceedingly different political ends, such as Isaiah Berlin. Berlin’s
avoidance of the universalism Tolstoy illustrates seems to have been performed in order
to affirm the pluralism of liberal democracy during the Cold War, and the majority of
scholars of Tolstoy following Berlin have at the very least used his interpretation as
foundational to their own. Even Love’s work, insightful as it is, only gives enough of an
interpretation to serve as the foundation for rebuilding the practices of historians. To be
frank, Love need not do more; he is, after all, not a historian. We have not given
Tolstoy’s argument the consideration it deserves, and have essentially continued to
engage in similar practices as he saw a century and a half ago, even before our discipline
had been formally established. We are guilty of the mistake of omission regarding
Tolstoy’s encouragement that we seek the universal rather than continue on in pursuit
through the particular. We have not even searched far enough to discover the pessimism
Tolstoy encouraged after reaching for the universal, much less have we considered a way
out of that pessimism. But that is not to say we have not understood some basic
difficulty extant in the problem of writing history through particular means (the
investigations of historical facts by particular historians). Historians have considered this
problem in their own ways, though without taking Tolstoy’s argument into account.
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CHAPTER THREE
HISTORIANS GRAPPLING WITH THE PARTICULAR AND THE UNIVERSAL
Historians have not engaged with Tolstoy in War and Peace with the
thoroughness Tolstoy’s polemic deserves. Historians have not addressed the issues
Tolstoy raises concerning the academic system history was involved in as self-interested,
nor have historians been thorough in challenging Tolstoy’s pessimism and determinism.
The fall of the great man view was replaced with a general sense of agency over
historical happenings possessed by all peoples, which does not address Tolstoy’s problem
with the presumption of agency in historical works. Other philosophers and thinkers
have worked to address what Tolstoy has to say about history, but as illustrated in
Chapter 2, most of their efforts fall short of considering the nuances demonstrated by
Tolstoy in his argumentation. Jeff Love, as a literary scholar, comes closest by casting
Tolstoy as deterministically identifying the human as finite, but that identification does
not have the type of solution for the future of the historical discipline searched for in this
work. Historians have not picked up where Love left off, and considered Tolstoy as an
entry point with which to think about the human as particular in the midst of the
universal, what that dichotomy means, and how the historical discipline may feature in
that dichotomy.
However, to say that historians have not attempted at all to philosophize as to the
epistemological nature of historical works would be unfair. It is rarely framed as clearly
as by Love, or as strenuously as in War and Peace. But the tension identified by Love,
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that of the finite in the face of the effectively infinite, the particular in opposition to the
universal, has still been explored. Leopold von Ranke sought historical truth in textual
evidence in German idealist fashion, and R.G. Collingwood saw history as an endeavor
of self-investigation. Edward Hallett Carr has speculated as to the construction of the
historical fact, and Hayden White wrote a now infamous book clearly identifying
historical work as created narrative. Those scholars also tend to occupy an uneasy
position with regards to the historian’s view of action. Most historians focus on the past
by investigating historical sources. The historians listed above, who undertake
philosophical investigations as to the methods and purposes of history, emphasize the
role of the historian’s present context in understanding the past. Few historians, however,
and none of those previously named, are overtly concerned with encouraging action for
the sake of future humanity based on knowledge of the past. Historians are generally,
therefore, passive. The knowledge they write is not for any path of action, but for its own
creation. Not only are they passive, which hinders the creation of universal future for
humanity, they also tend to be firmly entrenched in the tradition Isaiah Berlin so
staunchly advocated for, namely, pluralist particularity. Historians generally do not see a
significant problem with writing history from their own limited perspectives, as long as
historical evidence can support the relevant argument.
There are, however, some historians who sense the problem of the individually
produced narrative and seek different methodological approaches hoped to solve the
problem of a finite mind characterizing the past. These attempts have been more notable
for the nature of the challenge than for their effectiveness in dealing with the heart of the
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problem. Such subversive works are nevertheless still notable, and the methods they
demonstrate are worth analysis to investigate how close they came to overcoming the
particular-universal tension, and why they were unable to do so. Histories have been
written that embrace the fallibility of the particular and are written with qualifications and
exposure of the method of research at every step, like Steven Bednarski’s A Poisoned
Past: The Life and Times of Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused
Poisoner. Some histories have been written which feature opposing narratives which are
supported by historical facts. The Many Deaths of Jew Süss: The Notorious Trial and
Execution of an Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, written by Yair Mintzker, is a recent and
notable historical work which attempts to evade the issue of an individually-written
history by incorporating multiple, opposing voices into the narrative constructed by the
author. The exploration of these attempts is deserved both for the sake of the effort
committed by their authors and for the sake of argumentative thoroughness. Both the
historical-philosophical and historical works written for the sake of solving the particularuniversal tension with regards to historical truth are thus objects of interest.
Historical-Philosophical Explorations
Leopold von Ranke, a German historian in the nineteenth-century, is largely
credited with founding a scientific approach to history, through the collection of vast
amounts of data from historical documents, and is regarded as one of the most the most
influential historians on the professional historical discipline. In the 1973 edited and
translated volume Theory and Practice of History, Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von
Moltke introduce Ranke as one of the first historians to advocate the study of political
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narratives as the most scientific form of history: “Ranke let the facts speak for
themselves; and since history was past politics, these facts were contained primarily in
the documents of state. The method of Ranke, it was believed, pointed above all to
detailed monographic studies.”72 In the US and Britain, especially, the type of
misconstruance defined by Iggers and Moltke, of Ranke as a pure empiricist obsessed
with the endless collection of facts, has been massively influential. In the AngloAmerican intellectual sphere, “He was viewed as the prototype of the technically trained
historian and as a great representative of the positivistic scientific tradition of the
nineteenth century, a contemporary of Lyell, Wallace, Darwin, and Renan.”73 Ranke has
thus been largely recognized only for his influence on the formation of the discipline and
erroneously linked with an outdated methodological approach.
But, as Iggers and Moltke point out, Ranke’s history has greater nuance than pure
empiricism. In On the Relations of History and Philosophy, an essay from the 1830s
published in The Theory and Practice of History, Ranke describes the division between
history and philosophy, as well as the appropriate analytical methods to be undertaken by
the historian:
There are two ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs—through the
perception of the particular and through abstraction. The one is the way of
philosophy, the other that of history . . . These two sources of knowledge are
therefore to be kept clearly distinguished. Nevertheless, equally mistaken are
those historians who view all of history merely as an immense aggregate of facts
to be committed to memory, meaning that particulars are strung to particulars and
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all of these held together only by a common moral principle. I am of the opinion,
rather, that historical science at its best is both called upon and able to rise in its
own way from the investigation and contemplation of the particular to a general
view of events and to the recognition of their objectively existing relatedness.74

Historians, for Ranke, must explore the particular facts of history in and of themselves
(he says that a historian must have a “feeling for and a joy in the particular in and by
itself”), but equally important to the investigation of facts and the discovery of
themselves as they are is to analyze them and their connectedness to the whole of human
history. Both the individual particulars and their connectedness explored by Ranke, in
the tradition of German idealists, served in the greater plan of God, as pointed out by
Iggers and Moltke: “Ranke’s conception of history, thus, involves not merely a method
but a firm religious faith and a highly speculative philosophy shared by much of the
German idealistic tradition in the Geisteswissenschaften in the nineteenth century.”75
Ranke’s history, therefore, is still about discovery, despite its attachment to a unifying,
divine plan. It neglects the focus necessary for future action to create history differently;
Ranke’s theism, as theism influenced other German idealists, leads to an approach to
history which ignores the need for future action. Nothing needs to be actively created in
the present and future if the being of truth already resides in all temporality as a
manifestation of God. Misunderstood and simplified by non-German scholars as he was,
Ranke nevertheless lacked the action orientation necessitated by a history that can
overcome the particular-universal tension.
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English philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood, like most
twentieth-century historical-philosophers, was in opposition to the pure empirical
positivity held dear by many followers of Ranke. In his 1946 posthumously published
work (for which he is now best known), The Idea of History, he charted the progression
of philosophies of history through the mid-twentieth-century, and preceded the works of
Edward Hallett Carr and Hayden White. He viewed the results of empirical positivism as
unfinished. Only the first stage of that methodology, the collection of immense numbers
of facts, was ever accomplished, and the next stage, the use of those facts to determine
general laws of history was never achieved. Even the goal of greater knowledge about
history ended in irrelevance for the sake of more fact collection: “The historical
conscience identified itself with an infinite scrupulosity about any and every isolated
matter of fact. The ideal of universal history was swept aside as a vain dream, and the
ideal of historical literature became the monograph.”76 Collingwood was one of the
earliest historical constructionists who questioned how the historian actually creates
history as a product of their own temporal context. For Collingwood, all of historical
writing is an exploration of self-knowledge on behalf of the historian. The exploration
holds both on the level of the individual historian and for the collective efforts of all
humans in history, as Collingwood describes in the introduction of The Idea of History:
History is ‘for’ human self-knowledge. It is generally thought to be of importance
to man that he should know himself: where knowing himself means knowing not
his merely personal peculiarities, the things that distinguish him from other men,
but his nature as man. Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a
man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly,
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knowing what it is to be the man you are and nobody else is. Knowing yourself
means knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he can do until
he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done. The value of
history, then is that teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.77

Collingwood does not assert history as an avenue by which to create a humanity in the
future. Historical thought is a path by which to understand human thought; our own
exploration and reconstruction of the past motivations of humans teaches us about how
we are now. Historical thought enables us to learn about the present state of humanity as
informed by the past, and is not a tool to create a future humanity based on events in the
past.
To say Collingwood does not view history as a tool to create a future humanity is
to say that he disbelieves in the possibility of permanent progress. He affirms the use of
history to create change, although he leaves mentions of that until the last paragraph of
The Idea of History, as he is more concerned with history as a way to study the human
mind as a present-focused object of experience. His view is pessimistic:
If we want to abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them
but to bring into existence something better, we must begin by understanding
them: seeing what the problems are which our economic or international system
succeeds in solving, and how the solution of these is related to the other problems
which it fails to solve. This understanding of the system we set out to supersede
is a thing which we must retain throughout the work of superseding it, as a
knowledge of the past conditioning our creation of the future. It may be
impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may prevent us
from understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it
unless we are blinded by such hatred. But if that is so, there will once more, as so
often in the past, be change but no progress; we shall have lost our hold on one
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group of problems in our anxiety to solve the next. And we ought by now to
realize that no kindly law of nature will save us from the fruits of our ignorance.78

The approach to history-as-informing-action taken by Collingwood is strikingly similar to
that of Tolstoy. History may inform, but to act on it in an attempt to create something
better for the future—to engage in the manifestation of desire—solves no problem.
Tolstoy adds greater nuance by including an explicit dialogue of the particular-universal
tension as part of human nature, but Collingwood nevertheless echoes the pessimism so
prevalent in War and Peace, alongside a dialogue about the individual as a knowledge
constructor through the mind of the historian.
Collingwood quite elegantly describes the historian as a particular kind of
investigator. The historical enterprise is concerned with the past, of course, but not the
past generally. The historian is specifically interested in human history. Thus historical
investigation has two dimensions according to Collingwood, the outside and the inside of
an historical question. The outside of the question concerns the circumstantial elements
of the relevant question, with regards to “bodies and their movements;” for example, as
Collingwood writes, “the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river
called the Rubicon at one date or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the senate-house
at another.”79 The inside of an historical question is more difficult to penetrate because it
cannot be constructed from the evidence of documents alone. The inside is concerned
with the motivations of the historical actors concerned. In Collingwood’s example, the
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inside element of the investigation regards why Brutus would kill Caesar, that is, “What
did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?”80 Thus historical thought is
not only an investigation of the past, but an investigation of human thought, which
Collingwood believes to be the primary importance that history has with regards to
gaining humanity self-knowledge. The process by which this knowledge is generated is
necessarily through construction taken on by the individual historian as a presentist
enterprise: “But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to
discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own
mind. The historian of philosophy, reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought
when he expressed himself in certain words. The only way in which he can do this is by
thinking it for himself.”81 For Collingwood, the particular-universal tension has no
solution because history is always an individual-driven enterprise which can only result
in change, but never progress. Collingwood’s analysis is presentist and maintains the
intellectual status quo of the historical discipline in practice.
In 1961, Edward Hallett Carr described historians and histories in What is
History? as products of their own times, cultures, and places, following quite closely in
the footsteps of Collingwood’s work. He explored what it means to produce historical
works, and how “historical facts” come to be so. His opposed the common eighteenthcentury principle that facts may speak for themselves and must only be discovered:
This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them:
it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context .
80
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. . The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at
Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event. It is the
historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar’s crossing of that petty
stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by
millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all. The fact that you
arrived in this building half an hour ago on foot, or on a bicycle, or in a car, is just
as much a fact about the past as the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But it
will probably be ignored by historians.82

Carr characterizes writing history as a matter of construction, of selection and
interpretation of facts of the past by historians into a coherent narrative. Noting the
tenuous position of objectivity considering those conditions, Carr attempts to mediate
between the myth of historians as merely recounting historical facts and of historians as
freely creating narratives suited to their tastes, regardless of the body of facts. The
solution Carr shakily arrives at is to place historians in a purely historicist position: “The
relation of man to his environment is the relation of the historian to his theme. The
historian is neither the humble slave, nor the tyrannical master, of his facts. The relation
between the historian and his facts is one of equality, of give-and-take.”83 Carr’s
analysis, however, is poorly expressed; if historians and facts give and take between each
other, then why the previous characterization of facts as only relevant when decided so
by historians? The attempt to historicize historians makes no sense without some other
motivating force to adjudicate facts as having power in a context outside the historian’s
esteem.
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Carr thus attempts to avoid the particular-universal tension by relying on
“society” as a powerful, independent construct which can itself influence the outcome of
historical writings, regardless of the efforts of individuals. He opposes even the notion of
individuals as a functional unit with which to think of history, in the context of both
historical individuals (actors) or historians (narrators):
The common-sense view of history treats it as something written by individuals
about individuals. This view was certainly taken and encouraged by nineteenthcentury liberal historians, and is not in substance incorrect. But it now seems
over-simplified and inadequate, and we need to probe deeper. The knowledge of
the historian is not his exclusive individual possession: men, probably, of many
generations and of many different countries have participated in accumulating it.
The men whose actions the historian studies were not isolated individuals acting
in a vacuum: they acted in the context, and under the impulse of a past society. In
my last lecture I described history as a process of interaction, a dialogue between
the historian in the present and the facts of the past. I now want to enquire into
the relative weight of the individual and social elements on both sides of the
equation. How far are historians single individuals, and how far products of their
society and their period?84

As a socialist, Carr raises society up to be a force equal or even greater than the efforts of
individual actors, a force that is impossible to control. Individuals cannot operate apart
from society; they are subject to the collective. But Carr offers no groundbreaking path
forward based on that evaluation. He does not advocate for performing history in a new
or different way in order to explicitly orient the discipline to a universal future for
humanity. In fairness to Carr, he wrote earlier in his career, during the Second World
War, that there should be a massive economic overhaul to construct socialism in Western
countries in his book, Conditions of Peace. In Conditions of Peace, however, he wrote
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within the realm of international politics rather than the philosophy of history, and did not
incorporate the two. In What is History, the work where he concerns himself with the
philosophy of history, he states that historians write reconstructions rather than true
accounts, and leaves his analysis at that. His final conclusions are disappointingly vague.
He asserts himself as opposed to the many conservative voices present among politicians
and historians during his time: “they have nothing to offer us but the warning to mistrust
radical and far-reaching ideas, to shun anything that savours of revolution, and to
advance—if advance we must—as slowly and cautiously as we can . . . this seems to me
a singular blindness.”85 But, on the other hand, Carr makes no commitment to action, to
any plan or goal for historians. He is content with a passive optimism: “For myself I
remain an optimist . . . I shall look out on a world in tumult and a world in travail, and
shall answer [conservative opinions] in the well-worn words of a great scientist: ‘And
yet—it moves.’”86 So while Carr is not opposed to change, and even favors progress, he
offers no concrete plan to reconstruct the historical discipline for the sake of universality.
In 1973, American literary historian Hayden White set out in Metahistory: The
Historical Imagination in 19th-Century Europe to expose the underlying linguistic
structures which historians utilized in the nineteenth-century to create appeals for their
histories. His method is to take different successful historians and philosophers of history
and analyze the historical writing style of each using a Formalist approach to the
linguistic constructions utilized in their works: “For arguments there are the modes of
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Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism; for emplotments there are the
archetypes of Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire; and for ideological implication
there are the tactics of Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism, and Liberalism.”87 He also
includes a poetic analysis of the linguistic strategies used by historians, which he labels
Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony. White also concludes there is no
substantial difference between historical work and historical-philosophical work in terms
of writing, only in terms of the emphasis placed on analyzing historical events as opposed
to historical methods/thought. White’s general conclusions about writing history, and the
different philosophical approaches used by historians, are alarmingly relativistic for some
historians:
There are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can
legitimately claim an authority for any one of the modes over the others as being
more “realistic” . . . as a consequence of this, we are indentured to a choice among
contending interpretative strategies in any effort to reflect on history-in-general . .
. as a corollary of this, the best grounds for choosing one perspective on history
rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological.88

Any attempts, therefore, to “scientize” history, to create a discipline which takes a
mathematical, purely logic-based approach to the laws of history and use scientific
methods (much like Tolstoy urged) “represents only the statement of a preference for a
specific modality of historical conceptualization, the grounds of which are either moral or
aesthetic, but the epistemological justification of which still remains to be established.”89
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When White refers to the possibility for history to be written in terms of moral
and aesthetic parameters, he refers only to the narrative constructed around the facts.
White proceeds, for hundreds of pages after the preface in which he gives his thesis, to
write a regressive history. He provides evidential support for his argument based on the
historical documents of the historians and philosophers he studies, and supposes the
evidences therein to be self-evident enough for his argument to stand. He writes a
history that is based on the primacy of facts; as early as page five of Metahistory, he
refers to the historian’s task as the “arrangement of data from the unprocessed historical
record in the interest of rendering that record more comprehensible to an audience of a
particular kind.”90 The facts, the past, the evidences to be discovered, and thus the
unaltered material of historical truth takes precedence over the interpretation offered by
historians. Historians only differ in their arrangement of the data, which itself exists
unspoiled by the individual viewpoints of historians. In his own work, his appeal is
neither to logical reasoning nor philosophical argumentation, but to the evidence he finds
from those writers. His own argument is declarative: writing history is a certain way,
which can be demonstrated from evidence. He continues to argue for history written on
the basis of discovered facts, implying a discovery of some truth on his own part, which
leads to a pluralistic conclusion. White turns to an explicit advocacy for pluralism based
on his own process:
It may not go unnoticed that his book is itself cast in an Ironic mode. But the
Irony which informs it is a conscious one, and it therefore represents a turning of
the Ironic consciousness against Irony itself. If it succeeds in establishing that the
90
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skepticism and pessimism of so much of contemporary historical thinking have
their origins in an Ironic frame of mind, and that this frame of mind in turn is
merely one of a number of possible postures that one may assume before the
historical record, it will have provided some of the grounds for a rejection of
Irony itself. And the way will have been partially cleared for the reconstitution of
history as a form of intellectual activity which is at once poetic, scientific, and
philosophical in its concerns—as it was during history’s golden age in the
nineteenth century.91

The exact nature of the reconstitution that White references does not receive much
attention in Metahistory. At the very end of the book, White argues that Irony has
become dominant as the necessary perspective for historians in the twentieth-century,
which contains an “inherent skepticism, which passes for scholarly caution and
empiricism,” as well as “moral agnosticism, which passes for objectivity and
transideological neutrality.”92 But the reconstitution of history that White hopes for
offers no particular solution. He only wishes to see other perspectives to be viewed as
useful, to not be dominated by Irony: “Historians and philosophers of history will then be
freed to conceptualize history, to perceive its contents, and to construct narrative accounts
of its processes in whatever modality of consciousness is most consistent with their own
moral and aesthetic aspirations.”93 His proposed solution is therefore pluralist and
Skeptical. The freedom offered by the pluralist approach is, of course, much as with the
interpretations of War and Peace presented, the freedom to generate conflict. Without a
particular solution, a catch-all approach to writing and thinking about history that can
encompass all viewpoints without conflict, there is a guarantee of conflict. As much as
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White’s assertions lead in the direction of a values-based academic endeavor in the
historical discipline, they fall short of that conclusion. White instead reiterates pluralistic
arguments and truths as is now common for historians, at least in part to be evaluated
based on the factual aspect of any given historical writing. The solution offered by White
is a freedom from a dominant method through imagination. But the solution of freedom
from dominance can only guarantee a finite degree of freedom if it chains us to inevitable
conflict. White encourages no universal approach for history writing, nor does he
advocate the use of history for political action toward a universal end for humanity.
Examples of Historical Writing in Recognition of the Particular-Universal Tension
Much like the majority of philosophers of history, most historians are
particularists with regards to writing historical works. Historians overwhelmingly tend to
write according to the particular facts and sources they are concerned with, concede their
limitations as individual researchers and writers attempting to assert historical truth, and
recognize the plurality of possible narratives as true if the facts and sources may support
multiple narratives. Historians largely do so only in the background of their monographs,
their philosophical approach given either light recognition or none at all. Simon
Schama’s 1995 book, Landscape and Memory provides an excellent example. In the
seventeen page introduction to his work about the relationship between human history
and nature, Schama writes two comments in passing. The first concerns universality;
with regards to nature myths, Schama mentions the views of psychologist Carl Jung and
anthropologist Mircea Eliade, who both make generalities about the human species in
relation to nature myths. Schama states in some contradiction with those scholars that
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“My own view is necessarily more historical, and by that token much less confidently
universal.”94 Schama assumes the particularism of history without discussion.
At another point, he writes concerning the use of his book as a tool for
environmental politics: “Like all histories, this is less a recipe for action than an
invitation to reflection, and is meant as a contribution to self-knowledge rather than a
strategy for ecological rescue.”95 The casual assertions Schama makes are of a particular,
passive history, much reminiscent of R.G. Collingwood, whose work Schama is no doubt
acquainted with. Schama neither broaches the topic of history writing’s flaws as
dominated by particularism, nor posits the use of history for any political action, let alone
the triumph of a universal humanity. There are, however, a few historians who are quite
aware of the philosophical approach they take when writing an historical monograph.
The particular-universal tension is examined in one form or another, and a solution to that
tension is put forward. The mode of political expression in self-aware histories generally
remains quite passive, encouraging little in the way of direct action, but some
methodological philosophy is still utilized. Stephen Bednarski’s A Poisoned Past: The
Life and Times of Margarida de Portu, a Fourteenth-Century Accused Poisoner, and Yair
Mintzker’s The Many Deaths of Jew Süss: The Notorious Trial and Execution of an
Eighteenth-Century Court Jew, are two such examples.
Stephen Bednarski writes his 2014 work, A Poisoned Past, in the mode of a
particular genre of history: microhistory. The entire first chapter of A Poisoned Past is
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devoted to defining microhistory, and placing it in the historiographical context of
historical methodology. According to Bednarski, microhistory “takes a single, focused,
historical “moment” and uses it to shine light on a broader world.”96 Microhistory was
formulated in the 1970s and 80s as a reaction to the Annales School of history, which
advocated a “large-scale, quantitative, and statistical form of history,” and was popular in
the mid-twentieth century.97 The Annales School “focused on total or complete history
(histoire totale), took a big picture, long-term (longue-durée) approach to the past, and
saw large structures and enduring processes.”98 Microhistory, then, advocates for the
particular in history, and does so in order to avoid making assertions about history that
are so general as to miss nuances. It is the epitome of particularist history, so much so
that it not only avoids making general statements about history, but finds such
universalist sentiments to actively repress elements of history and to be error in the
historical enterprise. Microhistorians, like many contemporary historians, is focused on
the “lived experience of the majority of the human population,” of which the
macrohistorical approach utilized by the Annales School is little to no assistance.99
Bednarski’s book provides an exceptional example of particularism in history.
His methodological approach relies on microhistory, and he thus studied a single
“moment” (Margarida de Portu’s trial) by using a relatively small number of documents,
and focuses on a “little person” in history, who had no importance in the grand political
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narratives of the past favored by Ranke and his followers. But even aside from
Bednarski’s methodological research approach, and the first chapter dedicated to
explaining that approach, he affirms the particularity of his historical narrative in another
way. Through his book, he interrupts his own historical writing to explain why he writes
what he does. He breaks down the sources he uses, how he analyzed them, and includes
possibilities for how the sources could have been read in such a way to create a different
history that would be no less valid. For example, from pages sixty-six to seventy-five,
Bednarski explains the context of legal documents in medieval Europe, how they were
recorded, how legal historians analyze them, and how he himself analyzed them. In
particular, Bednarski notes that in the context of legal documents, microhistorians have
been criticized in the past for analyzing too few documents, per the general approach of
the microhistorical school. He explains how he addresses that criticism:
To determine the significance of the trials pertaining to Margarida and the death
of Johan [Margarida’s husband], I have cast them against a systematic study of
1,644 other cases preserved from the court of Manosque between 1340 and 1405.
I tracked these cases using a computer database, reducing each one to its
constituent elements. I tracked individuals as accused persons, denouncers,
witnesses, plaintiffs, or defendants, and noted their place of origin, current
citizenship, sex, and marital status, as well as their craft, trade, or profession.
Finally, I tracked specific charges, verdicts, and sentences. In addition to the
database, I transcribed 873 typed pages of trial records. This material provides
the filter through which I read Margarida’s trials and informs my conclusions. It
also provides me with wider familiarity about the characters who populate her
tale.100

100

Bednarski, A Poisoned Past, 74.

88

As Bednarski puts it, A Poisoned Past works “not . . . to remove the author. Rather, it
lays bare the working method of the historian and highlights weaknesses, flaws, and
dangers. The aim is twofold: first, to present the reader with a good historical yarn from
which to learn; and second, to show how and why historians attempt to do history.”101
Bednarski’s effort in A Poisoned Past is, no doubt, in extremely good faith.
There seems to be an honest attempt to write for a general audience, to educate as many
readers as approach the book, to be honest about the methods and analytical styles used to
write the novel, and to explain what historical writing is. Bednarski embraces the work
written by Collingwood, Carr, and White, and recognizes the limitations of historical
narrative as particular and restricted, barred from the universal. And while Bednarski
does embrace the pluralism and particularism of narrative as explained by those
philosophers of history, he does not fall into the trap of a simplistic relativism. He states,
concerning the main character of his narrative, Margarite de Portu, that “There is much I
do not know about this long-dead woman. But there is much of her I do know, or at least
think I can know.”102 Bednarski recognizes his own limitations, and openly portrays
them in his own narrative, but nevertheless asserts his authority as a historian over
knowledge, at least in a qualified form. Here again we see the equality of pessimism as
espoused by Berlin and others: even the individual who has devoted more research than
any other than possibly a handful of other people on the planet to a particular subject
must deny any certainty of their knowledge. Bednarski is likely alone with regards to his
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research effort on Margarita de Portu, but still writes as though all his conclusions must
be qualified. While there is an admirable thoroughness to his thought, and he does not
exclude himself from conditioned knowledge, his philosophical approach nevertheless
begs the question of why anyone would continue to write history. As Bednarski is clear
to say, different histories may always be written about the same subject, whether they
differ in philosophical approach, research method, or the “modern interests and
priorities” always at play in the construction of an historical writing.103 How, then, might
those particular elements be overcome?
Yair Mintzker proposes to answer the question of particularism with what he
refers to as “polyphonic history.” Mintzker reconstructs the historical events he is
concerned with—the trial and execution of Joseph Süss Oppenheimer in the early
eighteenth-century—by utilizing four different perspectives found in the historical
documents tied to the event. Those perspectives shape the outline of his book; each
perspective, and Mintzker’s analysis of each perspective, provides a full chapter on its
own. He uses the perspectives of persons relevant to the case but with differing views,
whose accounts are often contradictory and untrustworthy. While such a variety of
sources is not unusual in history, depending on the relevant event, the accounts
concerning Oppenheimer are particularly opposed to each other. Mintzker’s solution is
to take the conflicting accounts—those of the judge-inquisitor for Oppenheimer’s case,
the testament of some of Oppenheimer’s last visitors before his execution, the only
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contemporary Jewish account of Oppenheimer’s life and death, and one of the earliest
biographers of Oppenheimer—and analyze each in its own right, only indirectly learning
anything about Oppenheimer himself. But aside from the analysis of the accounts
themselves, Mintzker uses a much more interesting method in his book to address the
issue of a multiplicity of views. He introduces what he refers to as “conversations”
between each chapter in order to address the view of the reader in his book. In his own
words:
It [polyphonic history] is also manifest in my decision to include short dialogues
between me and an imaginary reader after each chapter. It is highly unusual for
this device to be used by a professional historian, and my employment of it is sure
to cause some controversy. I use it, however, for a reason. Over the past several
years, while presenting different parts of this book in the United States, Europe,
and Israel, I was simultaneously fascinated and taken aback by my colleagues’
reactions to my polyphonic methodology. The author-reader dialogues in the
book are by no means an attempt to tell future readers of this book what to think.
Rather, they are my way of both of responding to some obvious objections to my
methodology and of acknowledging their validity.104

As Mintzker says, the conversations he writes between chapters are unusual.
They are written in the format of dialogue, broken up into paragraphs stated by the
Author and the Reader. Mintzker does not hesitate to use the first-person, nor does he
shy away from making the Reader immensely perceptive and self-aware in order to
emulate the critiques Mintzker has received from early drafts of his book. The Author in
turns agrees and disagrees with the Reader, argues particular points, and both treats the
Reader with respect and demands authority as the historical researcher. In a simplistic
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sense, as Mintzker describes the conversations, they are a way to shake up typical
historical prose and create a more interesting work for a reader to engage with.
Throughout the monograph, Mintzker makes a number of literary references, particularly
Biblical ones, to which he draws attention through the dialogues, as he points out in the
Third Conversation: “I also use the fictive nature of a dialogue with an imaginary reader
to acknowledge and indeed draw attention to the literary elements in my own account.”105
In the Afterword, Mintzker gives more context to the narratological variations he tries to
include in a historical work. His dissatisfaction is both aesthetic and logical.
Aesthetically, most history writing still emulates the style of early-nineteenth century
novelists, an area in which our evolution Mintzker finds to be inadequate considering the
amount of literary changes to narrative structure that have taken place in the two
centuries since. Logically, and more importantly, we are reluctant to put to writing the
ways in which our opinions change, the ways in which we do not understand a concept or
piece of evidence, the way in which our finished works have a single voice rather than
the tangled woof of truth that would be a more honest depiction of our process.
Polyphonic history is meant to address those problems and ride the line between “the
Scylla of false omniscience and the Charybdis of ‘post-truth’ relativism”, in which there
lies “a whole world of possibilities.”106 Much like Bednarkski’s work in microhistory,
Mintzker desires to humble the historian as a limited individual while asserting the
possibility of a qualified knowledge about the past. But in Mintzker’s case, rather than
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focusing on the particular so much as to prioritize it and eschew generalizations about
humanity, he wishes to include multiple voices and perspectives into a single work.
Mintzker’s goal is to offer a multi-faceted view of Oppenheimer: “we are about to see
Oppenheimer portrayed from different angles: from up close and far away; in public, in
the interrogation room, and in prison; in a legal, social, and theological light; and in
Christian and Jewish terms.”107 Without using multiple, highly contradictory sources,
such a multi-faceted view would be impossible.
In a more complicated sense than Mintzker places it, his work attempts to
overcome the particularity of perspective and narrative by featuring multiple perspectives
and narratives. If knowledge cannot be a simple assertion by an individual, then a
narrative in which multiple individual perspectives are explicitly incorporated,
highlighting their differences, is Mintzker’s answer. Mintzker is, certainly, on an
interesting track. But polyphonic history, for all its interesting qualities, still falls short of
overcoming the particular-universal tension. It may be narratologically refreshing in a
field growing stale in its prose, but it still posits no truth. The best it can offer is a
narrative with more explicit incorporation of differing perspectives, in both Mintzker’s
sources and the conversations, but of course the range of perspectives in The Many
Deaths of Jew Süss is severely limited. The differing accounts of Oppenheimer must still
be reconstructed by Mintzker’s modern mindset. Mintzker featured the criticisms and
praise he received during his writing process, but he can only hear, and more importantly
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respect, so many voices. He is still the central element of the multi-vocal structure he
builds. He listened to other academics and specialists, other people that he respects,
loves, and dislikes. Everything said to him concerning his book was filtered through his
own understanding and perspective, and what he chose to present in the conversations
and how he presented them are inevitably shaped by him. In truth, the conversations in
The Many Deaths of Jew Süss are Mintzker talking to himself; the guise of the Other as
an object of correspondence is a guise of Mintzker’s own creation. The conversations are
largely a rhetorical strategy of persuasion rather than a revolutionary tool to change the
methods of historians. By assuring the reader that other voices are present in Mintzker’s
own writing, the reader is supposed to be persuaded that a different type of history is
being written. The conversations also serve as a way for Mintzker to be artistically
indulgent while writing a professional history; in the fourth conversation, regarding The
Story of the Passing of Joseph Süss, one of the four accounts of Oppenheimer and his
trial, Mintzker uses the Reader to more liberally interpret The Story than would perhaps
be generally accepted by other historians. Mintzker himself wondered if The Story was
written along the line’s of Oppenheimer’s supposed request than people would view him
as forgiven by God and read study the Torah after his death, an interpretation that must
be read into the source itself and not featured in the chapter about The Story. In the
fourth conversation, the Reader presents suspicion that Mintzker believes The Story to
have been written sympathetically, and Mintzker, in faux delight, explores that
possibility. As the Reader notes: “Surely, then, a book that holds these aspirations [to
sympathize with Oppenheimer in the way Mintzker believes The Story to do] cannot be
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considered a work of professional history?”108 The conversations are thus, as rhetorical
and narratological tools, self-serving for Mintzker, and unable to overcome the particular
at all. Mintzker’s approach only further illuminates the restrictions narrative and
particular perspective place on our knowledge and expression.
Historians and philosophers of history have engaged with problem of asserting
knowledge about the past. They have been conscious that there is some problem with the
declarations of the particular about the universal, and have had different solutions to this
problem. None, however, even those which seem as radical as Hayden White’s or as
narratologically unusual as Yair Mintzker’s, can overcome the particular. Each, with the
exception of theistic solutions like Leopold von Ranke’s, concludes that history is in the
end a particularist endeavor, and that there can be no alternative method which is able to
overcome the particular-universal tension. And those historians would still refuse to say
that history is an empty effort. They affirm the particular by continuing to write history
for the particular, for various reasons. But none of those reasons is given as explicitly
political; no action is urged by those historians. Philosophically wary historians see most
of the views presented in this chapter as radical and destructive to the historical
discipline. But instead the opposite is true; the views presented here (aside from
Ranke’s) only affirm the empirical pluralism already predominant in the historical
discipline. None of them posit complete relativism and moral emptiness, and none of
them posit a solution which can overcome all particular ignorance and bring about a
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complete universalism for humanity, an ascendance to certain truth. The philosophical
urgings of the historians who have contemplated the particular-universal tension are
overwhelmingly passive. They do not urge action, they do not urge putting the past to
use in creating a better future. They either try and redeem the suffering of past humanity
with lessons to make us feel better in the present, or lament the suffering of the past for
its own sake. The first is small in scope and content with the general status quo of our
existence, and the second is sickeningly passive, content to have knowledge of
humanity’s existential state of suffering as informed by the past without trying to do
anything about it, or even urge the rest of our species that our suffering is good. Writing
history can be more than impotent passivism and lamentation.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW HISTORY
The polemic raised in War and Peace against historians consists of an attack on
human agency, a non-teleological history, and the validity of narrative as a way to gain
knowledge about the past. Tolstoy also minces no words when accusing historians of
being elitist and engaged in history largely for the sake of self-interest; in Marxist terms,
bourgeois. Although we have determined that Tolstoy’s attacks on agency and nonteleological history are useless given the exercise we undertake in analyzing them, his
other critiques still stand with some substance. Tolstoy accuses historians of taking what
Jeff Love characterizes as the core of Tolstoy’s pessimistic determinism, our inability to
comprehend the universal because of our particular finitude, and desecrating that essence
of our being with efforts to benefit ourselves as individuals. In the words of Jeff Love in
his chapter on Tolstoy and peace in Tolstoy on War: “the most radical aspect” of
Tolstoy’s polemic against history is “the elimination of narratives directed by particular
views that have no ground other than a kind of collective self-interest.”109 Rather than
giving in to the natural laws that govern us, and living in accordance with them,
historians write narratives claiming knowledge about the past, which posit human agency
and influence on the course of history, anathema to Tolstoy’s universal determinist
history due to the attachment to particular, individual self-interest. And while Tolstoy
critiqued history as it was performed 150 years ago, the historical discipline has changed
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little since. Historians still posit human freedom in their histories, write narratives about
the past with vested self-interest, maintain a bourgeois status, but all the same avoid a
universal truth. And while historians tend to emphasize overarching political narratives
and warfare less than they did in the 1860s and are more amenable to limited plurality,
these are frankly cosmetic differences rather than substantive ones. Historians now differ
little from the historians Tolstoy attacked in War and Peace.
It is unfortunately difficult to counter some of Tolstoy’s claims, although the
academics who received Tolstoy have most often ignored his arguments concerning the
philosophy of history and the universal. Historians are, as is academia generally,
bourgeois. The histories we write are rarely for a general audience. They are far more
often for the sake of intra-disciplinary dialogue. They are written using sources most
often inaccessible to someone not affiliated with a university. Most importantly, the
histories we tend to write are particular and passive. No one writes history and frames it
as part of a certain truth; we instead write from our perspective, recognize that historical
narratives are always limited and shaped by their authors, and leave it at that. Tolstoy’s
characterization of historians as forgers, concerned with knowledge which has nothing to
do with a central truth, maintains its relevancy today. Historians encourage no action to
change the particularity of our species, nor do we seek a future universalism. Ranke,
Collingwood, Carr, and White encouraged no action, and historians today are little
different. Historians are concerned with the past and the present, and leave action and the
future for others. We have embraced our particularity, we maintain our bourgeois status,
and as such have fallen into a pessimism even darker than Tolstoy’s. Tolstoy thought
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submission to natural law, as a universal power, would keep humanity from the conflicts
inherent in the particular. We instead have given in to the pessimism of inevitable
ignorance and self-interest, and thus conflict.
But in the course of this work, we have decided that Tolstoy’s attack on our
freedom and ability to shape history as it unfolds is unworthy of the rest of his argument.
Tolstoy’s conclusion would pre-empt writing that conclusion out, arguing for it so
passionately to persuade others, and even the exercise Tolstoy undertook to reach that
conclusion. How could we take his advice seriously, when to consider whether it is
worth taking seriously assumes some impact in the world on our behalf as a result of our
judgment, an implicit example of agency? The answer he gives, submission to natural
law, resignation to our suffering as inevitable, abandonment of any hope to influence our
existence of our own will, is inherently pessimistic. Such pessimism and denial of our
agency insults the human. We have instead decided that we are able to choose how we
shape our future. If we wish, we may even choose to overcome our particularity and
embrace universalism in the fullest way possible. History, and historians, may serve to
bring about the future, should we choose to attempt it. To do so, historians must engage
in an atheistic enterprise, where human freedom is unbounded and we choose to shape a
future in which there is nothing which may dominate us. We must refuse the gods of our
past and present, however they may manifest. We must refuse time, suffering, and death
any hold over our existence as a species. Historians must embark on a truly universal
project, in which every member of our species is sublimated to a single entity, and
humanity achieves absolute mastery of the universe. The efforts of science and
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technological advancement will be the chief mechanisms to reach a universal end, human
ingenuity and tenacity their engines. But there is also a place for art in our effort, in
which history and historians may become of significant assistance. Historians mourn the
past because we are aware of the fullness of its suffering. We, better than any others, are
aware of what humanity has undergone in our search for truth and knowledge. Our
memories are full of the suffering we’ve witnessed from a distance, and we still do not
know all that suffering. If a true universalism is to be brought about, then historians must
engage every member of our species to that end. We must all make the decision for
ourselves that our particular individuality is worth giving up in order for humanity to
ascend beyond the gods which govern us, to overcome the limitations which generate the
crosses we bear and the sins we commit. Historians may serve as proselytizers for a
universal future by presenting exactly what it is that we are attempting to overcome, and
persuading others to do the same. We may become the heralds of an atheistic religion,
and cross all false boundaries between the members of our species in order to bring about
a universal humanity.
It is no small thing, of course, to propose the restructuring of an entire academic
discipline, let alone the development and dissemination of a new religion. We must
ensure that we have a firm grasp of the logical grounds to do so in the first place. The
philosophical quandary many historians and philosophers of history have been fixated on
is whether or not a single, true narrative of history exists and can be told by historians.
The vast majority of historians in the last century, especially since the Second World
War, have felt convinced that if such a narrative exists at all, it is undiscoverable by we
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historians, and thus historical narratives may all be respected according to the quality of
their evidence from historical sources. It is a pluralistic position which allows for a
certain degree of passivism on behalf of historians who wish to maintain history as a
neutral profession, without particular inclinations which may be construed as political.
While this is not a perfect description of all current professional historians, of course, it is
still broad enough to cover the vast majority of their approaches to history. Some
historians are more inclined to characterize historical narratives as value-driven in their
creation, and some historians are more inclined to value the use of evidence in historical
sources, but few if any are willing to completely disregard either element. What they all
have in common is a sense of passivism; history is not for any particular line of action,
but only for its own discovery.
But we are not interested in a pluralistic philosophy of history. We are interested
in a philosophy of history that will end conflict and violence, and the only way to do so is
to assist in the creation of universal world order in which individual identity is sublimated
to the greater entity of humanity. Tolstoy is quite thorough in his depiction of selfinterest in the War and Peace: self-expression and desire are harmful and lead to conflict.
But we wish not for a humanity that subjugates itself to greater powers, as does Tolstoy,
but rather a humanity which ascends above any power through the self-sacrifice of
individuals to the good of the species. We therefore necessitate a philosophy of history
which assumes the existence of our agency and freedom to influence history as humans,
and also rejects a pluralism which will keep our species artificially divided. The only
philosophy of history which may satisfy both those requirements is a political
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philosophy. We assume the active engagement of historians in shaping our world from
particular to universal, and to do so we must be willing to treat the past as a tool with
which to actively create the future. Most historians refuse to see history as political.
They instead favor a passive neutrality, in which the knowledge brought by history may
be put to political means, but where history itself is constructed in a plurality of valid
ways, none of which may be dominant. But there is still a dominance in the current
history: dominance of the particular, which in turn leads to the dominance of self-interest
and thus conflict.
Our logical foundation is strong. If we truly wish to end violence and conflict, we
must attain the universal, and to do that we must put history to use and unify its writing
under a single political narrative which affirms our own ability to change our future. But
current historians fear the predominance of one historical approach, especially one which
encourages action, out of fear of domination. In fairness, dominant, singular historical
narratives that have been pushed in the past, especially in the twentieth-century, have
been the tools of totalitarian states with violent ideologies, and have led to the deaths of
tens of millions. Fear of a dominant political and historical narrative is certainly justified.
Our history, therefore, must resist the simplistic temptation of dominance through
violence from the outset. We must establish ourselves as not only aimed toward
universal peace as our eventual end, but also during our journey to that end. Our tool to
spread the message of universality must be one of logical and values-based persuasion,
not coercion or the elimination of rivals. If we are to embrace history as constructed,
based on the analysis of Hayden White, then we should be willing to be morally
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conscious about the nature of our construction. If our cause should be for the betterment
of our species, then the approach we take and the methods we use should encourage that
betterment intrinsically. Our task is one of love; self-sacrificial, transformative, allembracing love. To fall into a cliché, Machiavellian, means-justifies-ends trope would be
inexcusable. If the new history were to do so, it would already be a lost cause, distanced
from the goals we set out here and hypocritical to its stated purpose.
If we do not allow the new history to engage with humanity in terms of violence
and coercion, and instead insist that it be a political movement of intrinsic peace, we risk
becoming passive rather than pacifist. Change, especially the radical types of change
proposed here, always brings with it an internal violence, at the very least. If we are to
bring our species to the common task of attaining a universal state, we will have to
change the minds of all individuals. To undergo a worldview change of that degree, from
self-interest and pessimism to the optimism of unified humanity, is a violation of all
previously held thought. This type of violence cannot be helped, and we should not be
wary of it. It is violence every human must experience in order to engage in the political
endeavor preached by the new history. To continue the analogy with religion, we must
encourage the internal violence of conversion. Here is one of the most important points
at which the new history diverges from Tolstoy; Tolstoy would have absolute peace
through submission and passivity. There can be no violence due to action through
conversion if humanity is surrendered to natural law. But in the new history, in a
similarly pacifistic stance as Tolstoy, there can be no coercion to bring about the radical
change inside all the hearts of humanity we desire. History avails us of all the suffering
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had on account of forced conversion. We know better than anyone the perils of religious
persuasion, whether they be the horrors inflicted on native peoples in conquered lands or
the faux righteousness of the Crusades. If we want to encourage internal change in
humans without coercion or violence, then the new history must have tools fit for the
purpose.
To be in line with the motivations of the new history, a logical imperative which
necessitates the universal for the sake of peace in tandem with a moral desire to end
suffering and conflict, the new history should engage on those levels: reason and
morality. Logical persuasion and public engagement are the necessary tools of the new
history. If we do not open ourselves to the broader public, then our works will be unable
to get the traction needed to persuade anyone of the importance of the universal. In a
somewhat similar sense to Bednarski’s work, our reasoning and motivation should be
bared. At every turn, the reconstructions of history we write should be clear in their
reasoning and purpose. And in a somewhat similar sense as Mintzker’s work, we should
be willing to engage directly with others in our reconstructions in order to demonstrate
the value of collective inclusion and effort. The base appealed to for feedback should be
far broader, but the work would nevertheless be a similar effort to Mintzker’s. If our
persuasion is open, honest, and morally driven, then our work should have no room for
factual concealment or elitism.
A politically driven and engaged history would immediately come under criticism
for being biased, dishonest as an institution of knowledge, and encouraging to relativism.
The new history is capable of circumventing those criticisms. We have already embraced
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bias; we recognize that all histories are constructed and that facts are only so valuable in
the historical discipline. The weakness of historical narratives, in part illustrated by
Tolstoy in War and Peace, thus far has been the way historians continue to posit biased
narratives as true based on the factual appeal, to cast histories as discovered truth rather
than constructed truth. Instead of embracing a plurality of already constructed and
therefore “biased” narratives or refusing to concede the degree of their construction, the
new history demonstrates the willingness to embrace construction as an element of
human freedom. By doing so, new historians may respond to the criticism of their open
bias by engaging in a values-based dialogue. If all historical narratives are already
constructed and therefore “biased,” then what bias is bespoken in their narrative? If the
new historian is biased with a desire to bring peace through nonviolence and a universal
state, and is opposed to a critic who is biased with a desire for conflict and self-interest,
then the dialogue is in some sense already resolved. The Holocaust-denier who will
endlessly argue the Holocaust never happened, if questioned correctly, will eventually
reveal a dislike for Jews and most likely other minorities. At the point of that revelation,
nothing further needs to be done on behalf of the new historian; the narrative proposed is
one of hatred and conflict, and is therefore not worth consideration. Rather than
questioning a bigot’s historical method and throwing up endless facts that will fall on
deaf ears, directly addressing the deficit of values at hand will go much further to deal
with the problem. The dialogue about bias may be shifted from an issue of whether or
not values influence historical narratives to how they should influence historical
narratives.
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There will be some critics who would judge a values-based history lacking in
some sense of intellectual integrity; if history is values-based, then it becomes little more
than moral conjecture, without basis in reality, and thus cannot be regarded as a rigorous
institution of reason and knowledge. This problem again coincides with the issue of
knowledge as discovered versus knowledge as constructed. As we have established with
previous historians and philosophers of history, historical writings are reconstructed
narratives, incapable of describing the past without involving the present. Writing history
by using documents and reconstructed events of the past for the sake of a future purpose,
as the new history seeks to do, in fact differs from the current method of writing history
only in the reason for its writing. History is currently written for the sake of presentist
concerns about current debates within the discipline, ensuring tenure, and other various
forms of self-interest, which Tolstoy illustrated a century and a half ago. Harnessing the
reasons for writing history and uniting all historians’ reasonings under a single purpose
does not demonstrate a lack of integrity as a discipline. Rather, it demonstrates an
agreement on the overarching purpose of writing history at all, lending the new history
greater integrity by recognizing both the reality of its method and the greater role for our
species that it may serve. To presume a history unified for the purpose of political action
lacks the integrity of a divided history, without greater purpose and used to enforce
current societal structures, implies a misunderstanding of how historians write history.
The greatest potential criticism of the new history is of its perceived relativism. If
historical knowledge is to be created based on values rather than independently existingfacts, the critic would ask, what stops anyone from declaring history to be any particular
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way they like, regardless of any historical evidence? Would history not become a
battleground for different values-systems to embroil themselves in, reminiscent of a
Schmittian appreciation for war, in which conflict is affirmed as the norm? But this
criticism, too, may be answered. To be for a values-based history, and against an
empirical history, is not to reject historical evidence. Rather, it is to displace historical
evidence as the pinnacle tool of history writing. If the new history is to concern itself
with the future and therefore action, then it must regard its own dialogue of values as its
primary impetus. Historical evidence is not to be ignored, only regarded as that which it
is: another tool for writing history. It is certainly an important tool, but far from the most
important. Narratives and facts, as constructed elements, do not rely solely on evidence,
and the new history embraces the act of construction as an expression of human freedom
and will. To claim evidence as king in historical writing, the empiricist position, is to
ignore the primacy of human reconstruction, the unshakeable element which drives all
historical writing, even with presentist, particularist philosophies. There is no universal
truth to be found in evidence, only data points with which to build a greater truth.
The new historian, therefore, still relies on historical evidence to construct
historical writings, but does so in order to write compelling narratives persuading others
of the importance of attaining a universal state of being. Facts are not raised up as though
to exist without the human; evidence is instead used to construct facts for the sake of the
universal end. By recognizing the significance of values in the writing of history and
dethroning empiricism from its elitist, bourgeois seat, new historians are forced to
recognize all historical narratives. There is no longer a simple way for a new historian to
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dismiss a proposed narrative wholesale because it uses the wrong evidence, no evidence,
or comes from someone without a graduate degree. New historians will therefore have
many more narratives to deal with, far outside the realm of academia. All historical
narratives, regardless of their source should be sublimated to a universal narrative
regarding humanity’s past of suffering and potential future born of action. But rather
than descending into a defeatist sense of relativism in the face of overwhelming numbers
of historical narratives, new historians are instead motivated to persuade others of the
importance of the universal; the new history is entirely bound up with bringing humanity
to a singular point of victory. It therefore brooks no relativism, and is willing to continue
working to persuade others of the importance of the future, the truth, of which new
historians will aid in the construction. It is with regards to the relevance of persuasion for
the sake of action that the new historian’s critique of history differs with Tolstoy; Tolstoy
paradoxically hoped to persuade us to act as though our actions have no meaning, while
the new historian acts in full belief of their own power to change the future.
It may be noted by those with some acquaintance with philosophy that the project
outlined here is quite reminiscent of history as described by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel. Hegel is famous for framing history as “dialectical,” that is, recursively
progressive to an end goal based on the evolutions of human societies. The end Hegel
foresees is complete human self-realization, which takes the form of Reason manifesting
itself through humans in the shape of a universal, ethical community. Reason, according
to Hegel, is the spirit of humanity, and manifests itself through us because Reason also
underlies the functioning of the universe itself. Hegel refers to Reason in that context as
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the Idea, or Spirit. It is our nature as humans to express the Idea by our own activity. All
humanity’s efforts should thus be guided to self-determinism, to the becoming-ofourselves-in-the-world. Stephen Houlgate’s book, An Introduction to Hegel, offers an
excellent analysis of history and truth in Hegel:
Hegel is an ‘idealist’ (in his philosophy of history, at least) because he does not
understand human character or identity to be some fixed, immutable ‘reality,’ but
rather conceives of human beings as actively producing their character and
identity in history . . . The goal of historical activity, for Hegel, is thus for human
beings to become conscious of themselves as freely and historically selfproductive and self-determining—not something fixed by nature—and for them to
build their world in accordance with that recognition . . . Becoming aware of the
true character of human existence does not mean for him simply becoming
conscious of a given, fixed reality or gaining a more accurate picture of what we
were like at the beginning of history. Rather, it means learning that we are in the
process of producing and determining ourselves.110
Hegel thus defies any pessimism about the nature of humanity. The exact way our
species expresses itself and becomes in the world is up to our own choices. We are what
we create ourselves to be, which is itself, as a result of our choices, our true form. We
are thus quite in line with Hegel with regards to our view of humanity and its future. In a
loose sense, we are also aligned with Hegel with regards to action; while Hegel does not
offer up how a professional historical discipline might conduct itself to assist in
humanity’s becoming in the fashion given here, to encourage human action for the sake
of future betterment fits with his philosophy.
One of the senses in which there may be some divergence between the new
history and Hegel is with regards to history as atheistic. Interpretations of Hegel
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concerning theism differ; there is a prominent leftist interpretation of Hegel as atheistic,
in which Hegel encourages us to become without the use of a God, or at most with a God
that is to be overthrown. In this interpretation, humanity transforms itself and increases
its knowledge of the universe so that it might achieve complete mastery of reality,
fulfilling our nature as manifestations of Reason by effectively becoming gods through
scientific and technological achievements. There is also a rightist interpretation, in which
the Spirit refers to the Christian God, and humans achieve the heights of their true natures
through submission to that God, to the point of suicide. In the lectures concerning his
philosophy of history, compiled by Hegel’s students, he writes concerning God and the
Spirit:
It is this final goal—freedom—toward which all the world’s history has been
working. It is this goal to which all the sacrifices have been brought upon the
broad altar of the earth in the long flow of time. This is the one and only goal that
accomplishes itself and fulfills itself—the only constant in the change of events
and conditions, and the truly effective thing in them all. It is this goal that is
God’s will for the world. But God is the absolutely perfect Being, and He can
therefore will nothing but Himself, His own will. The nature of His will,
however—i.e., His own nature, that is what we are here calling the Idea of
freedom (since we are translating the religious image into philosophic thought).111
The exact nature of Hegel’s relationship with God in the context of his philosophy of
history has thus been the subject of much contention. Stephen Houlgate’s position is that
any such actual entity, a God rather than a metaphorical motivating force, is an invention
of Hegel’s critics, rather than a dominant being towering over humanity. Regardless of
whether or not a God exists in Hegel’s framework, we have no need of such a thing. We
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may learn from Hegel how to articulate the role of human self-determination in our
future, and we assume our ability to accomplish that self-determination without the
assistance of a deity. We assume that we may find freedom within our own universe and
are capable of attaining that freedom by our own devices.
Aside from the issue of God, the new history may also diverge from Hegel in
another way. Again, depending on interpretation, Hegel may only refer to the ethical
community and the rational sublimation of individuals to the collective when he refers to
the fullness of humanity. It is also possible that his rhetoric concerning choice is just
that: humanity’s freedom as beings of Reason consists only in what we freely choose for
ourselves. But the new history advocates not just for human self-determination, but for
humanity to have incredible influence on the structure of the universe as well. The new
history is thus not only part of the leftist tradition regarding universality and the
overcoming of self-interest, but also within the leftist tradition of interpreting Hegel,
largely established by Karl Marx. Marx understood Hegel materially: humanity would
reach for perfect universality and equality through material means, by the equal
distribution of resources and technological development which will solve any
conceivable problem regarding the production of goods. And in fairness to Marx, the
communist society fulfills the ideal of the ethical community. But Marx views
communism as a determined condition for humanity, a state it will inevitably reach in
order to mediate between individuals. The new history is neither deterministic (departing
from both Tolstoy and Marx), and seeks a state of being for humanity beyond individuals,
a philosophical consideration almost entirely absent from Marx’s work. The new history
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understands the individual as an impediment to freedom; where there exists individuality
there exists difference, desire, and conflict. Freedom is freedom from those things, in a
similar way as freedom for Tolstoy is freedom from desire and conflict, but the new
history goes further. Freedom for the new historian is freedom from all dominant forces
which separate humanity and subject it to suffering, and thus even freedom from the
natural laws Tolstoy urges humanity to submit itself to in War and Peace.
The freedom so keenly eyed by the new history will likely take a great deal of
time and effort to create. Its exact path of evolution is not planned; its progression is in
the hands of those alive at each step. But at all steps, new historians must provide
themselves as the supporting element, reminders of the suffering which characterizes our
species as individuals. To provide that support, to be the keepers of the suffering in our
past, is our key contribution to the universal state of being. We can also, by
implementing that action-oriented imperative needed to create our future, assist in
creation by identifying those ideologies which would disrupt our progression to a
universal state. These of course include the obvious examples of racism, fascism,
nationalism, and the like, but also include capitalism, liberalism, and even democracy.
The former three are easy to identify as disruptive to the universal because they often are
bound up with violence, and presuppose differences among humans based on group
identities, quite obviously opposed to a universal state of being. The latter three,
however, need a little more nuance in explaining their opposition to a universal state of
being. They all may be considered universal in a simplistic sense, in that all humans may
participate under a single civil state organized by those systems and still function. There

112

could not be a single civil state framed by either fascism or nationalism, and racism
assumes the existence of hatred for particular groups, subverting the possibility of
universalism.
Capitalism is the easiest of the latter three to identify as disruptive to the
universal; it affirms self-interest, and leads to class division and inequality. Liberalism is
similar, though as a broader term is subject to more numerous definitions. In the context
of our approach to the particular-universal tension, we may understand liberalism as a
philosophical acceptance of self-interest, but with enforced regulation to ensure peace.
Liberalism seeks no radical change in the being of humanity, but rather seeks to adapt the
human to a peaceful state of governance based on the equality of individuals. It is thus
opposed to bringing humanity to a universal state of being. Democracy is similar: it
asserts the equality of individuals and advocates decision-making as a collective effort of
individuals, and thus does not function in the context of a truly collective manifestation
of humanity. This is not to say liberalism and democracy are not closer to universalism
than fascism or nationalism, or that they lead to exactly the same types of violences and
conflicts as fascism and nationalism. They do, however, allow conflict to remain, and are
generally oriented to some type of regulated capitalism. They are unable to eradicate
self-interest because they are founded on the human as a self-interested individual which
must participate in society alongside other individuals. They are limited because they
presuppose the human to be individual and particular. Liberalism and democracy should
therefore be understood as temporary measures at most, stopgaps to prevent greater
violence while we work toward better a better state of existence. It may be assumed that
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as advocates of self-sacrifice and a universal being for humanity, new historians should
be focused on a Marxist political state, in which the individual is disregarded for the sake
of communal good. It is true that communism is the political system most closely
connected to an ideal of the universal for humanity, and is thus in all likelihood a stage in
the process toward universal humanity, but communism is not the final evolution to attain
a true universal state. The political arena itself must be dissolved by the time the end
goal of the new history is realized, that arena only useful insofar as there are multiple
individuals which must cooperate under the same governing structure. Universal
humanity, the end goal of the new history, does not entail the possibility for individuals,
and thus politics will cease to have much meaning; there will be only decision, without
debate or equivocation.
By bringing humanity together into a single entity and dissolving all forms of
individual pursuit, humanity can begin the process of ending its own particularity. Our
particularity, or finitude, is manifest in multiple ways. The most obvious, and the
particularity mostly referenced in this work, is the particularity of individual identities.
Our species is separated into individuals, with their own respective thoughts, beliefs,
backgrounds, and desires. This separation causes conflict and violence when different
individuals exert their desires on the world in different ways. We compare, judge, and
seek to subvert each other as part of our separation. And certainly, overcoming our
individuality is a massive step towards transforming humanity into a universality. But
universality for our species is more nuanced than just ending individual identity. We are
not only particular because we have different perspectives and desires; we are separated

114

by that which is most particular: death. There has been no philosopher better acquainted
with death than Martin Heidegger, at least in the West. Heidegger refers to humanity as
Dasein, which translates to Being-There or There-Being. For Heidegger, death defines
all aspects of human existence. We exist in time as Beings-toward-death, with it always
in front of us. Death defines us as present. A key passage from Heidegger’s best-known
work, Being and Time, is worth reading in full here:
Death is a possibility of being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case.
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.
This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-theworld. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein
stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to
any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at
the same time the uttermost one.
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death
is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself
as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is
not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]. As such, death is something distinctively
impending. Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially
disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself. This item in the
structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death. As a
phenomenon, Being-towards-the-end becomes plainer as Being towards that
distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have characterized.112
In a sense unexplored by anyone in the same way before Heidegger, death is defined in
philosophy as that which defines the human. And as Heidegger points out in the
italicized lines (emphasis Heidegger’s) death “reveals itself as that possibility which is
one’s ownmost.” Death functions as that which ends our possibilities for being, and it
exists for all. Every single human is a Being-towards-death, shaped by the approaching

112

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, Blackwell
Publishers, 1962), 294-295.

115

end of our possibilities. And the death of Dasein is completely individual; no two people
have the exact same possibilities for Being, and thus the threatened elimination of those
possibilities, up to the point of death, is unique for Dasein. Heidegger demonstrates that
we are particular not only because we are separate, but because we die as individuals.
Heidegger thus shows us the most dominant theism of all: death itself as our god. Death
cannot be experienced because the moment it comes is the moment Dasein ends as an
experiencing being. Death dominates us all. We are defined by, and exist in light of, our
inevitable death. Death shapes our species in every facet of our lives, because our lives
exist in the context of their own ending, a result all Dasein are aware of. Death makes us
particular; we cannot be but finite if we cannot but cease to exist. Heidegger urges us to
accept Death as our god, though he calls himself atheist; for him, only the approach of
Death, and the way we suffer in the face of it, allow us to be human. We would not be
Dasein if we were not Beings-toward-death.
If we truly wish to attain a universal state of being, it would seem as though we
must overcome death itself. Even were we to unite all individual humans into a single
entity, if that entity could perish, it itself would only be one more particular among all
other finite entities in the universe. But how might death be overcome? Death is not a
thing which may be analyzed, nor is it a force which can be fought. As Heidegger says,
death is a possibility of impossibilities for being. Death and the particular are intimately
related, even beyond the context described in Being and Time. As long as something
may exist outside an entity, that entity is susceptible to the possibility of its own
annihilation. Without existing as an all-encompassing-state, in which there is no within
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or without, only what is, completely and totally united, death, and thus particularity,
persist. A singular humanity, in which all individuals are subsumed, is still particular if
there is that which it has not assimilated. The universe is large; a completely united
humanity remains vulnerable, particular, and deathful unless it itself attains the universal
as a state of existence.
To unite humanity with the universe, and embed our will into every aspect of
reality is the ultimate goal of the new historian’s universality. We raise up human
volition and self-determination, and place no limit our species’ right to assert itself in the
world. There should be no god over us, nothing outside us which may engage in a
dominant role without our consent. By some set of circumstances, the exact details of
which are beyond our current knowledge, our species evolved, and did so with the ability
to imagine the future, engage in creative pursuits, and reach the self-awareness of
sentience. We know ourselves as we are, and interact with the universe through our will.
We have evolved to be thinking, reasoning creatures. There is no determinism to do with
our condition, as Tolstoy would have us believe. We are simply as we find ourselves,
and to reject our ability to will ourselves in reality is to reject the human. Hegel had it
right when he said that history is the story of our own becoming. But as part of our
ability to will, it is also possible to will ourselves into limitation, to place on our species
some type of inescapable burden. Christianity settled for our sinfulness, Tolstoy settled
for our particularity, Heidegger settled for our deathfulness, to name but a few prominent
examples. To set a limit on our ability to will ourselves in reality is to declare a limit for
our ability to better ourselves. I cannot help but ask why we do this. I cannot help but
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imagine that there are things our species may do that are presently unimaginable, but still
entirely within the realm of possibility. I am not willing to concede that all the suffering
we are caused by ourselves, each other, and the conditions of reality as they are currently
set is inevitable, inescapable, or even, of all the possible adjectives, good. To say that
which leads to the suffering and pain of the human is good because of itself is to
characterize all of history as the successful chronicle of human misery, and to set one’s
self against the human as willful. To call suffering and death good because of how they
make us human is to condemn all those who follow us to the same fates as those who
came before. It is to accept war, genocide, disease, suicide, and misery as that which not
only does presently exist, but as that which should exist. What hubris! What pride, what
arrogance, what callousness, to say that the suffering of all our species, as long as we
should persist, is good, when we ourselves can never experience the suffering of those we
would condemn.
To turn into suffering, to say that our deaths and trials in life are good, is not the
supposed symbol of strength Tolstoy would have us believe. It is instead weakness,
surrender, a failure of imagination and will. It is the cowardice of concession to that-aswe-are rather than the bravery to create a new existence. The concerns of the
Heideggerians and others who advocate for human suffering are not of feasibility; such
banal appeals to present practicality are weak, designed to blind us to the incredible
progress our knowledge has gained in the last two and a half thousand years. For what
reason may practicality be a true barrier to human progress? Such an assertion is a
theism, a declaration of permanent, irreversible human limitation. And, like every other
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assertion about human nature, the theistic response is a narrative in which the narrator has
a particular interest. Those who encourage us to remain as we are, particular and
deathful, fear to change our Being, our conditions as we exist in the universe. They
believe that to be human is to be finite and mortal. Those parameters would indeed limit
our species to particularity and death, and thus suffering. But if we are willing to instead
characterize the human as that which is willful, then we have already demonstrated the
truth we are trying to create. We are what we decide we are. To make ourselves into
what we decide we are, we will need to engage in mastery over the universe. We thus
challenge Tolstoy’s determinism regarding universal law in domination over the human,
regarding the human as deterministically particular in face of the universal, and part from
him irrevocably. Tolstoy fears the Napoleon that causes destruction through action and
will, while new historians subvert the threat of Napoleonic dominance through selfsacrifice. Action and change will occur for an ethical good, that is, the end of death and
suffering and the attainment of universality, through love. While Tolstoy may be
credited with attempting to encourage a path toward peace, and refusing to hold up
military exploits and its associated suffering as was popular in history, his solution is
nevertheless one of subjugation. Reaching our end will in all likelihood take an immense
amount of time, and the process will be neither painless nor easy, but it nevertheless is a
task that we must unite behind. To become the universe, to transform from beings that
will ourselves in reality to a single being that both wills and is the universe, is the greatest
state of being, the highest singularity. The end goal of the new history is one of singular
atheism. Not only do new historians seek to eradicate the mythical gods worshipped in
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human history for the sake of reason, new historians seek to eradicate any dominant force
over the human, including death. The highest singularity is the ultimate becoming of the
human as willful. If there is any god in this universe, it will be humanity.
But to attain the highest singularity, as previously illustrated, necessitates
complete and total self-sacrifice. All individual humans must cast our individual
consciousnesses into a greater entity. We thus cease to exist as individuals, but persist
within a greater whole with which we are completely united, without division. Thus may
Death be subverted; functionally, death is the absolute end of possibilities for Dasein and
exit from the world, whereas self-sacrifice as described here is the choice of a single
possibility in the world without reserve. Death is the annihilation of what is, while selfsacrifice is the transformation of the extant. We will of course lose all the charms of life
that so many of us hang on to in order to avoid the suffering our particular existences
bring. We will lose family, friends, all relationships as they are (hopeful bridges between
distinct and separated entities). We will lose the experience of waking beside a loved
one, of seeing a child’s happy smile, of the memories associated with long friendships.
We will lose the material comforts and simple pleasures we sprinkle into our days, the
stylish clothes, video games, sweet foods and beloved possessions. We will lose the
excitements and tensions of sexuality and physicality. We will lose all abstract art after
we give up our selves, all those incredible expressions of individual genius in cinema,
literature, music, and the visual arts. Self-consideration, interest in intellectual subjects,
the type of writing which will belong to the new history, the inquiry I engage in here, all
philosophical thought belonging to individuals, will also end. Inasmuch as the charms of
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life are human but also particular, they will cease to be. It is natural to mourn their
passing, as they are expressions of how we are now, often the greatest such expressions.
They are indeed not to be given up lightly; without them, most of us would be mentally
and emotionally bereft of positive experiences. But all those charms of life are particular,
and must be given up on our journey to universality. Knowledge of their loss is
important, but more so is our ability to let them go without resentment.
With regards to the issue of human influence on the world, there has been a
universal history posited in recent years. In 2009, Dipesh Chakrabarty, an historian of
postcolonial studies, published an article in Critical Inquiry titled, “The Climate of
History: Four Theses.” In the article, Chakrabarty discusses the impact on history that
global climate change is causing. There is no longer as clear a difference between natural
history and human history, since humanity is actively shaping the natural environment on
a global scale. As Chakrabarty notes, it has been proposed to refer to the current epoch
of the Earth as the Anthropocene, in recognition of the massive impact humanity has had.
But the Anthropocene is neither complimentary nor optimistic. The name is given in
light of the negative consequences of human activity, most notable among them climate
change. But interestingly enough, the Anthropocene also engenders a universal look at
human history, at least in the context of the past, an effort mostly abandoned in the
historical discipline. In Chakrabarty’s conclusion, he contrasts the Anthropocene and its
universality with the optimistic universality of Hegel:
It is not a Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement of history,
or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis . . . Yet climate change
poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the
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universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world. It is more like a
universal that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global
approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian
universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We may provisionally call it a
“negative universal history.”113
A negative universal history is pessimistic, and must thus be subverted. The new history
would do the same to recognize the negative impacts of human activity on the world as a
negative universal history, but looks to future action to create a better world. The
mythical global identity referred to in the article must be one we create. In order to create
a universal future, we must be willing to recognize the mistakes of our past (indeed, they
are the motivating element of the new history) without giving in to the pessimism that
may so easily be engendered with a negative universalism.
In the arts, there are few better counter-arguments to a universal humanity than
the 1995-96 Japanese television show, Neon Genesis Evangelion. On first sight a
standard mecha anime in an apocalyptic future featuring young children fighting in giant
robots against alien invaders known as Angels, the show demonstrates itself to be one of
the most intense character dramas in television, filled with philosophical themes and
motifs regarding the human condition. Amid incredible religious imagery and motifs
from Freudian psychology, the somewhat obscure plot explores what human existence is,
and comes to a determination for what it should be. The show is set in an apocalyptic
future, in which giant aliens called Angels are invading our world with the intention of
destroying humanity; the opposition is fronted by the organization NERV, and supported
by the cabal SEELE. The main character, Shinji, is a lonely teenage boy recruited as a
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pilot for a biomechanical fighting robot, which are known as Evas. As the show
progresses and more characters are introduced, including Shinji’s father, Gendo, and
Shinji’s fellow pilot and object of his sexual attraction, Asuka Langley-Sōryu, among
others, the struggles of each character become more and more the focus of the story.
Each character is driven by some internal misery, a form of suffering that they cannot
overcome. Shinji wants to feel the love of his father Gendo, who in turn was so broken
by the death of his wife that he is incapable of giving Shinji the love a child deserves.
Asuka found her mother’s body after she committed suicide, and blames both her mother
for leaving her and herself for not being able to keep her mother at her side. But as the
show makes clear, the reason each person suffers is because they are all irreversibly
lonely, completely isolated from each other. Episode 4 is named “Hedgehog’s
Dilemma,” a reference to the work of philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. The hedgehog’s
dilemma, as described by Schopenhauer (although he used porcupines) refers to the
human need to provide each other comfort. As porcupines huddle together in winter to
keep warm, they prick each other with their quills; after enough of this, they compromise
by remaining a little apart. In the same way, when separate humans seek to comfort each
other in their mental and emotional distress, they cannot but hurt each other as their
differences collide.
The only character who seems to be at peace is the mysterious Kaworu Nagisa, a
boy who becomes a pilot late in the show after Asuka becomes catatonic after a mental
attack from an Angel. Kaworu immediately demonstrates his complete love for Shinji,
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and expresses to Shinji his own understanding of the human condition. In episode 24,
Kaworu notes Shinji’s tendency towards social isolation:
Kaworu: “You are afraid of any kind of initial contact, aren’t you? Are you that
afraid of other people? I know that by keeping others at a distance, you avoid a
betrayal of your trust. But while you may not be hurt that way, you mustn’t forget
that you must endure the loneliness. Man can never erase this sadness because all
men are fundamentally alone . . . You know, pain is something that man must
endure in his heart, and since the heart feels pain so easily, some believe life is
pain. You are delicate, like glass; that is, your heart is.
Shinji: It is?
Kaworu: Yes, this is worth earning my empathy.
Shinji: Empathy?
Kaworu: I’m saying I love you.”114

Kaworu urges Shinji to accept his own suffering and loneliness, to maintain what it
means to be human in a static sense. Later in the episode, Kaworu reveals himself to be
the final Angel, but allows Shinji to kill him out of love for Shinji and the human race.
Despite the death of the final Angel, the show does not end. The shadowy
organization known as SEELE wish to create a forced evolution for humanity. They and
their agents wish to unite all of humanity into a single entity, the process for which all the
fighting had taken place. They refer to their goal as the Human Instrumentality Project;
all humans would be united, leaving behind their individual bodies and identities and
becoming a vast living sea known as the LCL Sea. By uniting all of humanity, SEELE
wishes to end our suffering as individuals, believing that if we were not separate, then we
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could not hurt each other. The climax of the story is when Shinji is given the
responsibility (through various plot mechanics) of choosing whether or not to force
humanity’s evolution in this manner, or leave humanity as composed of individuals. The
final episode consists of Shinji’s internal dialogue, mulling over his own suffering, the
suffering of others, and why humans suffer at all. He eventually makes the decision that
to evade suffering by forcing our evolution and abandoning our particularity is a
demonstration of weakness, fear, and hatred, much like Heidegger. And like Tolstoy, he
resigns our species to everlasting particularity. His reasoning, relying on the advice of
Kaworu, is to justify suffering itself. Suffering may exist, but so too does love, of others
and the self. Shinji says, “Maybe I could love myself. Maybe my life could have a
greater value. That’s right! I am no more or less than myself! I am me! I want to be
myself! I want to continue existing in this world! My life is worth living here!”115
While Shinji’s path to self-acceptance and love is moving, the show nevertheless affirms
not only the particular, but specifically self-interest. Shinji makes the decision to keep
humanity separate out of his own desires. Even SEELE engaged in the evolution toward
humanity by force, without the consent and communal self-sacrifice of all humans. The
show ends with Shinji surrounded by all the other individuals he knows inside his own
mind, congratulating him on his journey to self-love. The music rises with hope and
positivity, and the sky inside Shinji’s imagination is clear and bright. The suffering that
Shinji and Kaworu justify is nowhere to be seen.
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Many watchers were disappointed in the simplicity of the show’s ending, and
after a year the creators reimagined the ending as it took place in the world outside
Shinji’s mind in the movie End of Evangelion. As that movie ends, Shinji appears on the
shore of the red LCL Sea under a night sky, having made his decision to remain an
individual. Asuka is the first individual to leave the Sea, and lies next to him. Without
dialogue or music, only the LCL Sea breaking on the beach behind them, while both
characters stare wide-eyed, Shinji rolls over and begins to throttle Asuka. His breathing
is shuddery, and his hands shake with effort. As he chokes her, she reaches up and gently
caresses his face. He ceases throttling her, and begins to sob. The movie ends with
Asuka, without inflection, saying, “How disgusting.”116 No motivation for either
Asuka’s or Shinji’s actions is given, but the scene serves as a microcosm for humanity as
depicted in the story. Suffering, accompanied by love and forgiveness, will remain. The
last scene of End of Evangelion better demonstrates the truth the story wants to impart to
us than the last scene of Neon Genesis Evangelion. It provides a more honest and explicit
depiction of what the story argues humanity should be; lonely, isolated, unexcused from
suffering, but loved.
But for all that love is held up as the answer to humanity’s problems, the story has
a weak argument. It addresses the problem of suffering that is caused by other humans,
often referred to as moral suffering, quite well. Love is indeed the best answer for
individual beings. But what kind of love is it that Hideaki Anno’s story advocates, but
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the love of individuals? The story may very well satisfy us that through love and
forgiveness, we can work through life by coming to peace with moral suffering, but the
love between individuals will not help us overcome suffering, or bring us to a
universality. More deeply extant than the suffering of individual humans in relation to
each other, as is posed in Evangelion, is the suffering of that which is finite, of that which
is faced with the end of possibilities. Tolstoy understands the suffering of the finite, and
in like fashion to Anno can only see that love is the solution for enduring human
existence. Tolstoy’s broader sense of human suffering exists not only because of our
individual beings; it exists because of self-awareness of particularity and death, which is
the suffering that Heidegger wishes us to embrace as inevitable. Hideaki Anno’s story
fails to address the validity of this suffering in adequate fashion, but still attempts to
negate the possibility of a universal humanity. Tolstoy wished for love as well, for peace
and submission to natural law. But love in that form, love that is mere submission to
what is, will not avail humanity from its suffering. The love that is needed to bring a
universal humanity must be active and completely self-sacrificial; it must be love that is
universal, all-encompassing, and transformative. Without such love at the core of the
new history, we will fall to self-interest.
It may be noted that attaining a universal state of existence as described here is far
beyond the type of universality defined by the likes of Hegel and Marx. It is admittedly
in the realm of science fiction and religion in terms of present feasibility. But new
historians look to the future; we seek action, influence, agency, and above all else
enshrine the human ability to declare and create its own truth, its own existence. And
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even aside from the general spirit of the argumentation heretofore presented, to unite
humanity with the universe itself and attain complete mastery over it is the logical end of
seeking the universal. While such a goal seems far-fetched at best, and laughable at
worst, especially to we historians, whose tools to assist in reaching the universal will
become useless as soon as individuals cease to exist, the efforts of science and
technological development have already gained our species incredible developments.
Our knowledge of physics has come so far in the last century and a half as to make
physics in the nineteenth-century seem laughable. We have accomplished much to
research the underlying structures of the laws of the universe. Though they still confound
us, especially in the realm of quantum physics, we learn more and more, and are
discovering how to control and manipulate reality in ever-more complex ways.
Simulations of our own sentience and intelligence in the form of A.I. are becoming more
and more similar to ourselves. In the near future, thanks to the medical sciences,
robotics, computing, and artificial intelligence, we may very likely see the unification of
human and computer, or human and machine. Genetic engineering is another avenue by
which we may change the way we exist in the universe in the very near future, one which
holds both promise and foreboding, as with all such avenues. From the most far-fetched
to the already-on-our-doorstep, possibilities for changes to our being exist for us to
choose or not. There are many, especially in the wake of industrialization, global
capitalism, and massive climate change, who fear the potential humanity wields to shape
the universe. There are some who would even halt our ability to progress, who would see
the end of technological developments that would change our being in order to prevent
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the destruction to the universe they see as inevitable. In some ways it is hard to blame
those who only fear, those who are pessimistic about what humanity may do given the
opportunity. Thousands of species have gone extinct or been significantly diminished
because of human efforts and carelessness. Pessimism, combined with a submission to
the natural laws which govern us, is the Tolstoyan message in War and Peace. But, of
course, the only reason there can be so much fear is because there is so much potential for
change in the human. And change is only what we make it, what we choose it to be
through our own actions and the actions of those who follow us. Where there are huge,
universe-changing potentialities for humanity to make mistakes and commit
unforgiveable errors, there are equally universe-changing potentialities for humanity to
get it right, and do things which create a universe better than the one we came into.

129

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahearn, Stephen T. "Tolstoy's Integration Metaphor from War and Peace." The American
Mathematical Monthly 112, no. 7 (2005): 631-38. doi:10.2307/30037547.
Anno, Hideaki. Neon Genesis Evangelion. Directed by Hideaki Anno. (1996; Tokyo:
Gainax, Tatsunoko Production, 1998), Television.
Anno, Hideaki. End of Evangelion. Directed by Hideaki Anno. (1997; Tokyo: Gainax,
Production I.G/ING, 1998), Film.
Any, Carol. "Boris Eikhenbaum's Unfinished Work on Tolstoy: A Dialogue with Soviet
History." PMLA 105, no. 2 (1990): 233-44. doi:10.2307/462559.
Bednarski, Steven. A Poisoned Past: The Life and Times of Margarida de Portu, a
Fourteenth-Century Accused Poisoner. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2014.
Berlin, Isaiah. The Hedgehog and the Fox. Edited by Henry Hardy. 2nd Edition.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953.
Carr, Edward Hallett. Conditions of Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1942.
Carr, Edward Hallett. What is History? New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. "The Climate of History: Four Theses." Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2
(2009): 197-222. doi:10.1086/596640.
Christian, R.F. Tolstoy’s War and Peace: A Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History: with Lectures 1926-1928. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994.

130

Eikhenbaum, Boris. Tolstoi in the Sixties. Translated by Duffield White. Ann Harbor,
Michigan: Ardis Publishers, 1982.
Emerson, Caryl. "Leo Tolstoy on Peace and War." PMLA 124, no. 5 (2009): 1855-858.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25614415.
Hegel, G.W.F. An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Translated by Leo Rauch.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1962.
Houlgate, Stephen. An Introduction to Hegel. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Lednicki, Waclaw. "Tolstoy through American Eyes." The Slavonic and East European
Review 25, no. 65 (1947): 455-77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4203864.
Love, Jeff. The Overcoming of History in War and Peace. Studies in Slavic Literature
and Poetics. Amsterdam: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004. http://0search.ebscohost.com.www.pascalcat.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN
=160158&site=ehost-live.
Love, Jeff. “The Great Man in War and Peace.” In Tolstoy on War, edited by Rick
McPeak and Donna Orwin, 85-97. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2012.
McLean, Hugh. In Quest of Tolstoy. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2008.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zxsjx2.

131

Mintzker, Yair. The Many Deaths of Jew Süss: The Notorious Trial and Execution of an
Eighteenth-Century Court Jew. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2017.
Morson, Gary Saul. Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potential in “War and
Peace. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987.
Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the Historical
Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ranke, Leopold Von, and Wilhelm Humboldt. The Theory and Practice of History: Ed.
with an Introd. by Georg G. Iggers and Konrad Von Moltke. New Transl. by
Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad Von Moltke. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.
Schama, Simon. Landscape and Memory. New York: Random House Inc, 1995.
Sendich, Munir. "TOLSTOJ'S "WAR AND PEACE" IN ENGLISH: A Bibliography of
Criticism (1879-1985)." Russian Language Journal / Русский язык 41, no.
138/139 (1987): 219-79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43909490.
Sharp, Hasana. Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011.
Steiner, Lina. "Tolstoy, Liberal and Pluralist: On "Personality" and the Protagonist in
"War and Peace"." Russian History 36, no. 3 (2009): 424-42.
http://www.jstor.org/stab/24664576.
Struve, Gleb. "Tolstoy in Soviet Criticism." The Russian Review 19, no. 2 (1960): 17186. doi:10.2307/126739.

132

Tondre, Michael. The Physics of Possibility: Victorian Fiction, Science, and Gender.
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2018.
Tolstoy, Leo. War and Peace. Translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky.
New York: Random House Inc, 2007.
Trepanier, Lee. 2011. “Consciousness, Memory, and History in Tolstoy’s War and
Peace.” Perspectives on Political Science 40 (1): 35–43.
doi:10.1080/10457097.2011.536734.
White, Hayden. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.

133

